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In light of Deng Xiaoping 's advanced age (80 years old), the
Chinese leaders, without a historical precedent of smooth
institutional succession or the ability to rely on legal
documents, are, once again, facing the same pattern of
uncertainty, instability, conflict and major policy change
related to succession. This thesis will explore the prob-
lems and possible solutions of the succession issue. In the
introductory Chapter, five factors are identified as the
major problems associated with the Chinese succession.
However, only military, power base, and Deng's policy alter-
natives will be discussed in this thesis. Chapter II looks
at the People's Liberation Army as political and military
institution on the one hand, and as a participant in the
political succession struggle on the other. The concept of
political power base will be analyzed in Chapter III by
examining Deng Xiaoping vs Hua Guofeng. Chapter IV deals
exclusively with Deng's attempt to build a consensus that
will avoid repeating turbulence associated with succession.
In the Conclusion Chapter, an attempt will be made to specu-
late the near term (5-10 years) outcome of PRC succession
politics. At the conclusion of this thesis, an epilogue
discusses the United States' near term interest (s) in PRC
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ROMANIZATION
The official romanization system^ currently enforced by
the People's Republic of China is the PINYIN system. The
Pinyin system has virtually replaced all other forms of
romanization, even in the most common place-names and
personal-names- -"Peking" is now "Beijing", "Canton" is
"Guangzhou", "Mao Tse-tung" is now "Mao Zedong", and "Teng
Hsiao-ping" is "Deng Xiaoping". Western publications are
rapidly following suit and I have, therefore, used pinyin
throughout, with minor exceptions. Where a personal name is
both will-known in a traditional from and is almost
unrecognizable in pinyin, I have retained the conventional
spelling: thus, "Chiang Kai-shek" and "Confucius." Also,
in the case of a title of a book or an article and the
author's name, where pinyin is not used during publication,
then, the original form will be maintained: "Chung Kung Yen
Chiu" (Studies in Chinese Communism) is a monthly
publication by the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan and "Cheng,
J. Chester" is a personal name. However, when quoting from
translations or texts I have taken the liberty of
substituting pinyin for the original ronmanization where a
name appears . Here are some of the most difficult and
^"Romanization of Chinese Names of Persons and Places",
Beijing Review, 5 January 1979, pp. 18-20.
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troublesome pronunciations in the pinyin system: "c" is
pronounced like the "ts" is "tsar"; "x" is like the "sh" in
"shore"; "zh" is like the "g" in "George"; and "q" is like




Throughout Chinese history prior to the establishment of
the Republic, succession to the imperial throne could
generally be achieved by tr.ansfer through inheritance within
th§ family or employment of violence to overthow the
existing imperial family. Violent overthrow of an existing
imperial family was marked by the decline of the old
imperial family; followed by the growth of various new and
shifting centers of power; and eventually by the capture of
the "Mandate of Heaven" by one of the power contenders. It
is interesting to note that the one that ultimately captured
the "Mandate of heaven" was not necessarily the most
powerful contender of the group. An example of this was Li
Yuan, the founder of Tang Dynasty.
Yang Guang, the second and the last Emperor of Sui , ^ was
a ruthless and ambitious person who murdered his own father
and recklessly wasted imperial resources. In less than
thirteen years, he was dethroned from the power center by a
group of power contenders. ' Interestingly, among the major
^After approximately 350 years of turmoil in China, Yang
Jian, Yang Guang' s father, reunified China in 581 A.D. and
established the Sui Dynasty. The Sui Dynasty lasted from
581 to 618 A.D.
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contenders to overthrow Yang Guang were Yang Xuangan of
Shangdong; Li Me and Wang Shichong of Henan; Li Zhitung
,
Du
Fuwei, and Shen Faxing of Jianghuai; Lin Shihong of Jiangxi;
Liang Shidu, Gouzi, Xue Ju , and Li Zhi of the Northwest;
and, lastly, Li Yuan of Taiyuan. Although Li controlled one
of the most favorable positions within the empire, he did
not became a contender for the empire until 618 A.D., two
years after the disintegration of the Sui Dynasty and seven
years after the first rebellion. ^ How, among many strong
contenders for imperial power, were Li Yuan, the Duke of
Tang, and his son, Li Shihmin, able to take the lead and to
succeed when others failed?
The most common transfer of imperial power was through
inheritance within the imperial family. But, even this
widely accepted and well-defined institutional procedure did
not necessarily entail political peace nor lack of violence.
In order to become Emperor and gain legitimacy, many
ambitious individuals within the imperial family have often
resorted to violent measures to eliminate their competitors.
As we have discussed earlier, Li Yuan was the founder of the
Tang Dynasty. His second son, Li Shihmin, was the
right-hand man who assisted Li Yuan in the defeat of the
other contenders. According to the established
^Gou Tienyi, History
,
(Taipei: Ministry of Education
Publication, 1963), pp. 103-107, (this is a history
textbook used by all high schools in Taiwan)
.
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institutional procedures, Li Shihmin's elder brother was the
ttaditional rightful heir to the throne. However, in the
year of 626 A.D., Li Shihmin managed to kill both his elder
and younger brothers and force his father to abdicate from
the throne. Thus, Li Shihmin became the second Emperor of
the Tang Dynasty.
Not surprisingly, fratricide was not uncommon in the
brutal court politics throughout Chinese history. Cao Zhi
,
a well-known poet, who was a loser in the struggle to
succeed his father, Cao Cao, as premier composed the
following poem prior to his elder brother's order to execute
him: ^
They were boiling beans on a beanstalk fire,
Came a plaintive voice from the pot,
Why, since we sprang from the selfsame root,
should you kill me with anger hot?
Thus, historical precedent suggests that without a legal
system of succession, adventurous men throughout the land or
even within the same family will always, when opportunities
arise, contest for the throne.
^Allegedly, Cao Zhi was ordered to either compose a poem
within the time a person can walk seven step or face
execution. For the whole story see Lo Kuang-chung, Romance
of the Three Kingdoms
,
trans. C. H. Brewitt-Taylor
,
(London:
C. E. Tuttle Co., 6th ed. 1975), Vol. 2, p. 198.
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B. RULES OF THE GAMES
Unlike western democracies with highly open, legalistic,
and institutionalized procedures, the transfer of power in
the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been marked by
similar strife and contention as discussed in the last
section. However, it would be wrong to say that the PRC and
other socialist states do not have "rules of the game" in
the form of legal regulations or constitutions. In fact, in
comparing the constitutions of the United States and the PRC
on the succession process, one finds that there are numerous
similar legalistic features. There are many parallel
characteristics in the terms, duty description, methods, and
Presidential election procedures of the two countries:"*
US CONSTITUTION
Section 1
. . . . (The President) and, together with the
Vice-President, ... be elected, as follows: Each
State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the
whole number of Senators and Representatives to which
the State may be entitled in the Congress; .... The
Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote
by Ballot .... The Person having the greatest Number
"^The content of the following comparisons are taken from
Article II and Amendment XXII of the US Constitution, and
Articles 79, 80, 81, and 84 of the PRC 1982 Constitution.
Alpheus Thomas Mason and William M. Beaney, American
Constitutional Law : Introductory Essays and Selected Cases
,
5th edition, (Englewood: Printice-Hall Inc., 1972). And
The Constitution of the People ' s Republic of China,
(Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1983), promulgated for
implementation on 4 December 1982.
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of Votes shall be the President .... No person except
a natural born Citizen, . . . shall be eligible to the
Office of President . . . neither shall any Person be
eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to
the Age of Thirty-five Years ... in Case of the
Removal of the President from Office, or his Death,
Resignation, or inability to discharge the Powers and
Duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the
Vice-President ....
Amendment XXII
No person shall be elected to the office of President
more than twice ....
Section 2
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the US . . . and he shall have Power to
Grant Reprieves and Pardons .... He shall have
Power ... to make Treaties, . . . shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls ....
Section
_3





The President and Vice-President of the PRC are elected
by the National People's Congress. Citizens of the PRC
who . . . have reached the age of 45 are eligible for
election as President or Vice-President of the PRC. The
term ... is the same as that of the National People's
Congress, and they shall serve no more than two
consecutive terms.
Article 84
In case the office of the President of the PRC falls
vacant, the Vice-President succeeds to the office of
President
Articles 80 and 81
16
The President of the PRC . . . appoints and removes the
Premier, Vice-Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers in
charge of ministries . . . issues orders of special
pardons; proclaims martial law; proclaims a state of
war; and issues mobilization orders .... The
President of the PRC receives foreign diplomatic
representatives . . . appoints and recalls
plenipotentiary representatives abroad, and ratifies and
abrogates treaties and important agreements concluded
with foreign states.
However, as history reveals itself, many aspects of
formal documents, including those dealing with the most
crucial elements of power, bear little relation to reality
in PRC or any other Communist countries. Even more to the
point, the leaders of PRC have never been prepared to be
strictly bound by their own rules including those which were
enacted in good faith. Given the conflict of interests
between legality and personal political survival, communist
leaders have repeatedly swept away legal encumbrances such
as State and Party Constitutions in favor of personal gains.
Four State Constitutions (1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982), a
provisional State Constitution (1949), and five Party
Constitutions changes (1956, 1969, 1973, 1977, and 1982) in
the thirty- three years of the People's Republic do not lend
strong credence to its legal obligations. Furthermore,
without any attempt to seek constitutional legitimazat ion, a
former President of the State, Liu Shaoqi , was deposed; a
Prime Minister, Hua Guofeng, was appointed; and a Deputy
Premier, Deng Xiaoping, was deposed. Therefore, the "rules
of the game," in the case of PRC ' s succession, will only be
17
kept and enforced when they are not being preceived as an
impediment for the implementation of the political goal by
the ruling elites.
C. THE POLITICS OF POLITICAL SUCCESSION
The transfer of power, not only in the PRC but also in
other socialist states, has been regularly marked by bitter
factional struggles and conspiretorial dealings among the
political elites.^ Currently, Chinese leaders, without a
historical precedent of smooth institutional succession or
the ability to rely on legal documents, are, once again,
facing the same pattern of uncertainty, instability,
conflict, and major policy change related to succession.
The narrow discussion of a single successor to the
position of the Chairman of the CCP or President of the PRC,
is, unfortunately, an unrealistic assessment of the PRC '
s
succession process. As we have witnessed in the past twenty
years, Liu Shaoqi , the President of the PRC from 1959 to
1965, could neither protect his interests nor hold his
^A stronger case than the PRC is that of Soviet Union.
After the death of Lenin, Stalin, the Party's General
Secretary, jointed with Zinoviev and Kamenev to repress the
Troskyites in order to consolidate his position; later, he
collaborated with Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov to eliminate
Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Party center. In the wake of
Stalin's death, Khruschchev went through the same drill in
order to win the top leadership position. For more detail
on Soviet leadership power struggle see Merle Fainsod, How







University Press, 1967), pp. 149-161 and 164-175.
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position during the Cultural Revolution. Finally, he was
purged and committed to a mental institution
.
where he died
in 1969 in disgrace.^ Lin Biao, Mao's chosen successor to
the Chairmanship of the CCP in April 1969, died in
mysterious circumstances in 1971. Finally, it appeared in
1976 that the PRC had found a solution to prevent a
repetition of Mao's earlier tragedy by selecting Hua
Guogfeng as the Chairman of the Party, Chairman of the
Military Commission, and Premier of the State. By 1977, it
appeared that Hua, with the support of Ye Jianying and Li
Xiannian, had established himself as the supreme leader of
the PRC. But, again, the whole was different from the sum
of its parts. Holding the top positions does not
necessarily equate to power, stability, and survivability of
one's political fortune in the PRC ' s political succession
process
.
Therefore, when studying succession in China, one must
return to fundamentals. This means that one must grasp the
essential features of Chinese politics and political
culture. Fortunately, since the CR and the normalization of
the Sino-US relationship, many details as well as the main
^Liu was posthumously rehabilitated at the 5th Plenum,
11th Party Congress, 1980. For more detail on Liu's fate
during the CR see Adrian Hsia, The Chinese Culture
Revolution
,
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1972), chapters
IV-VIII. Also see Fox Butterfield, . China: Alive in the
Bitter Sea
,
(New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 354.
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outlines of the political process have been made available
to students of contemporary Chinese politics.
This thesis will, in light of Deng Xiaoping 's advanced
age, explore the problems and possible solutions of the
succession issue. Today, the situation is substantially
different from what it was a decade ago. History does not
inevitably repeat itself. However, the current Beijing
leadership has not yet developed an institutionalized
procedure for replacing political leaders of all echelons
thereby rendering itself likely to repeat pre- 1980
succession patterns. Moreover, the current political
climate tends to reinforce the tendency toward factional
disputes, conspiretorial dealings, and power struggles.
Those in charge of the Party and state institutional
apparatus monopolize the entire spectrum of Maslow's
"hierarchy of needs". Thus, political power will continue
to be equated with privileges and prosperity. Since
political power generally derives from political struggles,
the elements of military and political followings (power
bases) are the vital ingredients to ensure success.
This thesis will first examine the operation of the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) as political and military
institution on the one hand, and as a participant in the
political succession struggle on the other.
The concept of political power base will be analyzed in
Chapter III. Specifically, Chapter III focuses on the
20
question of why Hua Guofeng, who appeared to have control of
all the power positions, lost to someone who had been
stripped of all political power. The process by which this
reversal occurred raises many questions about the political
survivability of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in a post-Deng
environment
.
The Fourth Chapter deals exclusively with Deng's attempt
to build a consensus that will, at best, avoid catastrophies
and, at worst, implicate all potential rivals in any
mistakes. Chapter Four is divided into three sections. The
first section presents Deng's policy of distribution of
power to ensure a winning coalition. The second section
discuss Deng's policies of ideological redefinition and
economic reform. And the third section analyzes Deng's
military reform policies and their impact on reducing the
PLA's influence in the internal political process.
In the concluding Chapter, an attempt will be made to
speculate the near term (5-10 years) outcome of PRC '
s
political succession. Realizing the danger and purely
speculative nature in predicting the outcome of the complex
problems associated with political succession, I will focus
this Chapter along the lines of answering the question:
Will China, after Deng Xiaoping, be able to maintain minimum
political conflict and ideological oscillation while
continuing to pursue modernization policies?
21
Finally, in the Epilogue Chapter, I will briefly and
superficially discuss and analyze the issues that are likely
to confront the US policy makers during the period of
Chinese political succession. Furthermore, a policy
alternative will be suggested at the closing of this
Chapter.
22
II. THE MILITARY : A PARTICIPANT IN THE SUCCESSION PROCESS
A. MILITARY INSTITUTION: A DEFINITION
Military, as a societal institution in the Democratic
Western world, is functionally specialized and
professionalized in national defense and structurally
separated from other sectors of society.' In order to
minimize the risk of military intervention, formal
institutional arrangements are worked out to assure civilian
supremacy and the political neutrality of the military
establishment. The specialization and professionalization
of the armed forces in military tasks is established as the
legitimate institutional norms. Direct involvement of the
armed forces in nonmilitary activities, such as economic
development and social reform in the society at large, is
considered the exception rather than the rule.
This chapter wishes to examine the operation of the
People's Liberation army (PLA) as a political and military
institution on the one hand and the political dynamics of
internal rivalries and power struggle in China's political
succession on the other.
'See an excellent work on this subject by Samuel P.
Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1957.)
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B. A BRIEF HISTORY: 1940-1980
The experiences of the PLA in China from its inception
to early 1980s evolved around distinctly different
characteristics. Prior to 1976, Mao Zedong not only
emphasized organizational penetration of the army by the
Party to guarantee political control over it but also
stressed the importance of, a systematic use of the armed
fo:fces for a wide range of nonmilitary activities.
Throughout the various stages of revolutionary movement and
socialist construction, the Chinese military (in addition to
shouldering the main burden of military tasks and national
defense) has been mobilized to organize and indoctrinate the
masses, to take part in agricultural and industrial
production, and to support social and political reforms.
Mao's military thinking persistently demanded that, as a
matter of fundamental principle, the armed forces ought to
function both as a "fighting force," and as a "working
force," and that
Every Communist must grasp the truth, 'Political power
grows out of the barrel of a gun. ' Our principle is
that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never
be allowed to command the Party.
^
^Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong
,
(Peking
Foreign Languages Press, 1967), II, p. 224.
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The ability of the PLA to serve as a multifunctional
force came under its severest test during the transitional
period of 1947-1949, when the tide of the civil war turned
in favor of the Communists. This development confronted the
Communist forces with many urgent and difficult problems,
such as the necessity of converting a large portion of
military manpower to civilian uses in the newly occupied
areas and managing the takeover of administrative control at
all levels.^ Under Mao's call to turn the Army into a
"working force," crash programs were set up to further
enlarge the role of the army . ^ ° In the meantime, army cadres
were transferred in great numbers to civilian sectors to
perform nonmilitary tasks. Indeed, the activities of the
PLA in this transitional period were so extensive and
diffuse on all fronts that it was virtually impossible to
draw any meaningful distinction between the military and the
nonmilitary.
In the course of the revolutionary wars, conflicts and
tensions did emerge from time to time between Party and PLA
leadership, between military commanders and political
commissars, and among those with different perspectives and
approaches to army-building. However, as will subsequently
^A Doak Barnett, Uncertain Passage : China' s Transition
to the Post Mao-Era
,
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Instituteion, 1974), p. 71.
'"Barnett, p. 353.
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be made clear, the strong preoccupation of the top leaders
with the awesome tasks of war and revolution and their
concern over the urgent and immediate problems of security
and survival vis-a-vis the Nationalist Government prevented
the conflicts and differences from developing into crisis
proportions
.
During the early fifties, the PLA played a key role in
managing the administrative takeover by organizing the
military control commissions which governed in the urban
centers. Below the national government, the six regional
military and administrative committees, which were dominated
by the military, functioned as the highest local authority
in the country until 1954.^^ To reduce the army's burden on
the nation's shaky postwar economy and to strengthen local
control, large numbers of soldiers were demobilized and
transferred to the civilian sector. Many military units
were detailed to help with agrarian reform. Later they also
took part in the collectivization and communizat ion
campaigns at the grass roots level. The military was also
actively involved in a series of massive movements to
suppress counter-revolutionaries and class enemies in the
postwar years . ^
^
^ ^An excellent study on the PRC transition period of
1949-1955 is done by A Doak Barnett
,










^Richard C. Thornton, China: the Struggle for Power
,
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By the 1960's, the military's vast role in the political
arena had become unmistakably clear. - The PLA under the
energetic leadership of Lin Biao was upheld as the model of
political purity, selfless dedication, and correct work
style for the entire nation to emulate. In 1964 and 1965,
political work structures modeled on those of the PLA were
systematically introduced into the civilian sector, and a
large number of military cadres were transferred to lead the
new organizations. When the turmoil of the Cultural
Revolution (CR) threatened basic political stability and
social order, the role of the PLA expanded still further.
The PLA was enlisted to intervene militarily by imposing
"military control" on government organs, economic
enterprises, and educational institutions.^^
After Mao's death, Deng Xiaoping' s military supporters
rallied to his side and negotiated his return to political
power (Deng was purged once during the Cultural Revolution
and once after Zhou Enlai ' s demise in 1976). However, in
less than a half decade since his return to political
spotlight, Deng alienated many military leaders who had
supported his comeback. His principal protagonists raised
1917-1972
,
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973),
pp. 224-225.
^
^This theme will be discussed later in this paper. For
an in depth analysis of Lin Biao incident see Michael Y. M.
Kau, The Lin Biao Affair : Power Politics and Military Coup ,




1. the evaluation of Mao,
2. reassertion of firm Party and government control over
the military forces,
3. restriction of the PLA to an essentially military
role,
4. professionalization of military ranks, thereby
eliminating the over- aged, unskilled, and
unqualified,
5. and modernization of national defense but only as a
function of the modernization of the economy as a
whole.'"
Whether Deng will be successful in la^/ing a smooth succes-
sion transition of power and policies is directly propor-
tional to his ability to overcome many of the above
mentioned objections and win the support of those who
currently oppose him. The performance and development of
the PLA since the establishment of the Peoples Republic of
China (PRC), however, has raised some serious questions
regarding the Mao's model of "the Party commands the gun."
At times , the military has tried to withdraw from nonmili-
tary work and political participation. At other times, the




"Leadership in China: Pvivalry,





tion and military rule. At one point the military has even
come close to carrying out an "unconfirmed military coup
d ' etat . "^^ Thus, in contrast with the Western model of
military institutions, which stresses a high degree of
professional specialization, organizational differentiation,
and political neutrality, the Chinese model, as articulated
by Mao, is marked by the multifunctionary , structural
diffuseness, and polit icization of the Military.
C. THE POLITICS OF THE PLA AND PARTY
In his excellent study of the military as a profession,
Samuel P. Huntington advances the theory that "the
distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special
type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility, and
corporateness . " ^ ^ According to this formulation, the
professional is marked by his specialized knowledge and
skills in a vocation which are acquired only through
prolonged training and experience. As a result of this
process, he internalizes a code of professional ethics and a
sense of social responsibility through the process of
^^The most notable examples of the military acted as
arbiter between competing forces within the leadership are
the PLA's intervention in the Cultural Revolution (CR) and
later in the succession struggle with the "gang of four".
See Ellis Joffe and Gerald Segal, "The Chinese Army and







socialization into the profession. He also develops a
normative orientation supportive of the effective
performance of the professional functions. The members of
the profession tend to share a collective sense of organic
unity, consciousness, and identity. Once the military
becomes highly professionalized, therefore, the military man
is likely to be proud of his special training and competence
in military affairs and to guard jealously his professional
autonomy, prerogatives, and authority against outside
interference. Any external attempt to impose control over
what the professional, in this case the military, defines
as his legitimate activities is bound to be resented and
resisted . "• ^
D. PROFESSIONAL PLA PRIOR 1976: A NARROW SENSE
The history of the development of the PLA as a
professional military establishment suggests considerable
validity of Huntington's theoretical argument. Even in the
late 1920' s, when the Red Army had just been organized form
scattered groups of guerrilla armies, the introduction by
Mao of Party control and political work immediately met with
considerable opposition from the military commanders who
resented the dilution of their prestige and authority. At





reaffirm the strategic importance of political work and to
criti-cize the "purely military viewpoint" of the military
officers . " ^ ^
Military professionalism began to emerge as a major
policy issue following the end of the civil war in 1949,
when the new regime shifted to an emphasis on
institution-building and modernization. As the government
and the Party assumed more and more of the administrative
and economic functions that had previously been assigned to
the military control commissions and the military and
administrative committees at the local level, the PLA
withdrew from its nonmilitary activities and moved toward
specialization and professionalization in military affairs.
The military confrontation with the United States in the
Korean War further heightened the military's sense of the
need to modernize as rapidly as possible so as to be able to
cope effectively with modern warfare . Moreover, the
introduction into China of "modern" Russian military
equipment and related organizational forms helped establish
the "advanced experience" of the Soviet Union as a model for
the Chinese . ^
'
^^See William Whitson's excellent study on the
opposition arised during Ku-t'ien conference in The Chinese
High Command : A History of Communist Military Politics
1927-1971
,
(New York: Praeger University Press, 1973), pp.
29-46.
^^Ellis Joffe, Party and Army
,
(Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1965), pp. 1-45.
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The trend toward differentiation between the military
and the non-military sector was clearly reflected in the
sweeping administrative re-organizations at the regional
level in 1954. The six regional military and administrative
committees (together with the six greater administrative
regions) were abolished in order to centralize bureaucratic
control; it was also decided that the regional and district
military commanders should not hold key Party and
administrative positions at the province level concurrently
as they had in the past.^"
By 1954 the PLA had also developed an elaborate and
highly centralized command and logistics system supported by
a large number of military academies offering specialized,
professional training. A conscription system was formalized
in 1955 to emphasize the development of a regular
professional army, downgrading the role of the militia. The
adoption of the Regulations on the Service of Officers in
February 1955 formally introduced into the PLA, as part of
its movement toward regularizat ion and professionalizat ion,
a highly stratified system of ranks with differential pay
and privileges, modeled after the Soviet pattern^ ^ As the
newly emerged officer corps and the veteran military leaders
^^ James C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics : An
Introduction
,
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1980),
p. 148.
^
^Harlan W. Jencks , From Muskets to Missiles
,
(Boulder:
Westview Press, 1982), pp. 49-50.
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became increasingly committed to the course of
modernization, they began to - attack the informality,
flexibility, spontaneity, and egalitarianism that had been
such central aspects of the guerrilla tradition as and
obsolete and dysfunctional. They argued that technical work
should replace political work as the new military order. ^^
The military leaders also began to perceive the strength of
the PLA primarily in terms of its professional and
technological quality rather than its ideological commitment
and extramilitary capability. Thus, in the military
barracks the balance of priorities in training tipped in
favor of professional and technical matters.
The increased emphasis on professionalism and
modernization was also frequently articulated in the policy
statements of military leaders. For instance, reporting to
the Eighth National Party Congress held in September 1956,
Peng Dehuai , then Defense Minister, declared:
We must intensify our study of modern military science
and technique, the art of commanding a modernized army
in battle, and new military systems. Unless we put
greater effort into the study of these things, we shall
not be able to master and make use of the most
up-to-date weapons, or command a moderized army in
battle, and consequently we shall not be able to build
our army into an excellent modern revolutionary army . ^
^








(White Plains: International Arts &
Science Press, 1973), pp. xl-xli.
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The growing demand for moder.ization and
professionalization within the military eventually set the
stage for the open struggle between "two lines" in the late
1950' s: the Maoist line and the "revisionest" line on the
role of the military.^'* The supporters of the Maoist line
apparently sensed the challenges of professionalism as early
as 1953, when a nationwide conference of the PLA's senior
political work cadres was called to examine what they
considered "deviations" from the "glorious tradition" of the
Red Army . ^ ^ A new set of Draft Regulations of Political Work
was reported to have been adopted in April 1954 in an
attempt to reassert the primacy of the Maoist line of army
construction.
The attempt to control the challenge of professionalism
was renewed in 1957 and 1958 through a series of major mass
movements, such as the rectification campaigns, the movement
to send "officers to the ranks," and the intensification of
ideological training. But these efforts did not come to
fruition until the whole nation was radicalized by Mao's
push for the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the communizat ion
movement in 1958. As the GLF gained momentum, the army was
mobilized on a massive scale to take part in capital
construction, perform relief work in flood and drought, and
2 I* Thornton, p. 237
^^John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army
,
(London;
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 251.
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help organize and streamline the management of rural
communes. Beginning in 1958, the militia was once again
reinvigorated through he mass movement to make "everyone a
soldier." The troops and military academies were all caught
up in an intensive campaign to study Mao's thought and
military writings. ^^ As the individual campaigns coalesced
into the nationwide push to put "politics in command of
everything" in 1958 and 1959, the Maoist line seems to have
regained the level of strength it had achieved in the early
1950 's.^^ It is worth noting, however, that if it were not
for the fact that the massive campaigns happened to coincide
with the purge of the top proponents of a modern army such a
Peng, Minister of Defense, and Huang Keqing, chief of staff,
the triumph of the Maoist military ' line over the
"revisionest" line in the late 1950 's might not have been
possible.
The appointment of Lin Biao to be in charge of the
Ministry of National Defense and the Party's Military
Commission in September, 1959 marked a sharp return to the
Maoist line. Under Lin's leadership the political work
system and the Party organizations in the army underwent a
major overhaul. Political education for the rank and file,




central task in the day-to-day activity of the army. In
1961 the Party reissued, with great fanfare, a comprehensive
set of Political Work Regulations for the PLA in every
service and at every level. ^* The Regulations reaffirmed the
Maoist line as the "guideposts of both the political and the
military work of the Army." By the mid- 1960 's the PLA had
reemerged as a vigorous multifunctional "working force,"
taking a leading role in every mass movement and actively
participating in every aspect of national life.^^
Even in the midst of this impressive success in putting
the Maoist line back in command, however, the "sins" of
professionalism continued to be a problem. As revealed
during the Cultural Revolution, Lo Juiqing, the chief of
staff from 1959 until 1966, was found to have pursued the
same "revisionest" line on the development of the military
advocated by his predecessor, the purged Huang Keqing. He
was accused of sponsoring the mass campaigns for "great
competitions in military skills" to enhance the priority of
military professionalism, technological superiority, and
technical training. It was said that he covertly undermined
the political control over the PLA, encouraged the
withdrawal of the army from nonmilitary work, and sabotaged
^'Kau, Political Work System of the Chinese Communist
Military
,
(Providence: East Asian Language and Area Center,




the dual- control system in the PLA. And once again, in
1966, a major purge was required to rid the military
establishment of the tendency toward a "purely military
viewpoint . " ^
"
The purges of key military leaders and the controversies
between the "two lines" of the military in the 1950 and
1960s clearly points to a serious shortfall in the role of
the PLA.
E. MILITARY IN COMMAND
A second source of challenge to the stability of the
Maoist model stems from the mult ifunctionality of the PLA.
Expansion of extramilitary functions enables the military to
play a major role in political affairs and encourages the
military to assume political power. In contrast with the
danger from military professionalism, which involves a
contravention of Mao's military thinking, the risk of
military domination or intervention results from an overly
enthusiastic application of Mao's doctrine with regard to
the use of the military as a "working force." The dominant
role played by the PLA over the Party and the other sectors
of society prior to and during the CR typifies this latter
type of problem.
^°For the purge of Peng and related development, see
Ralph L. Powell, "The Party, the Government, and the Gun,"
Asian Survey , 6 (June 1970), pp. 441-471.
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In the West, civilian supremacy over the military has
been safeguarded by the segregation of the military
establishment from civilian sectors organizationally as well
as functionary and by an emphasis on the institutional norms
of the military's political neutrality and professional
autonomy. In other words, civil-military conflicts are
inhibited by maximizing military professionalism and the
norms of institutional specialization and autonomy. Samuel
P. Huntington characterizes this pattern as the "objective
civilian control" of the military. ^^ In the "totalitarian"
model, represented by the Soviet Union, the military is also
functionally specific and distance from other sectors. Yet
the military is heavily penetrated by the party
organizationally and is turned into a political arm in
complete subordination to political control. Under such a
system, civilian-military tensions are also kept at a
minimum. ^
^
The Chinese model, while differing completely from the
Western model, is similar to the Soviet model in one
respect, that is, the organizational penetration of the
military by the Party.
^
^Huntington, pp. 83-85.
^^Information derived from Prof. Huff's class
discussion.
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The pattern of military development in China since 1949
has vividly illustrated such dangers in the practice of the
army's extramilitary role. Among the top leaders purged in
the periodic outbursts of the struggle between "two lines,"
many have been professional military commanders or
commissars with active ties to the military establishment.
They include such prominent names as Kao Kang (Commander of
the Northeast Military Region, 1955), Peng Dehuai (Defense
Minister, 1959), Huang Keqing (Chief of Staff, 1959), Lo
Juiqing (Chief of Staff, 1965), Li Qingxuian (Political
Commissar of the Chengtu Military Region, 1967), Yang
Jiangwu (Acting Chief of Staff, 1968), Huang Yunsheng (Chief
of Staff, 1971), and of course, Lin Biao (Defense Minister,
1971). Their downfalls, it is worth noting, all took a very
similar pattern. The charges against them invariably
involved the sins of seeking power, establishing "mountain
strongholds," and challenging the authority of Mao and the
Party
.
F. LIN BIAO: A CASE STUDY
Probably no case can better illustrate the basic
characteristics and process of the development of the
military as a participant in the power struggle better than
the changing role played by the PLA under Lin Biao's
leadership in the 1960's. Beginning in the late 1950 's and
particularly during the "three hard years," the PLA, started
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to assume a more active role in support of the massive
campaigns for production, construction, socialist
transformation, and emergency relief. ^^ By 1962, when the
PLA's internal overhaul and reinvigoration had been
completed, the army began turning outward even more,
exerting conspicuous influence in society at large. From
1964 on army heroes were hailed as revolutionary models for
the whole nation to emulate, as part of the movement to
"Learn from the PLA." Between 1964 and 1966, an
organizational structure modeled on the army's political
work system was introduced into schools, trade
organizations, factories, and even Party organs throughout
the nation; and army cadres were transferred to man the
newly organized political work departments in all sectors of
civilian life^"
The power and influence of the military grew still
further during the CR. As the regular Party apparatus and
state bureaucracy were paralyzed by the Red Guards' violent
attempts to seize power from the "powerholders" and
"capitalistic readers," the military emerged in early 1967
as the "mainstay of the dictatorship of the proletariat"
The army was finally asked by the Party to intervene to
maintain order when armed conflict seriously threatened the
^^Kau, LPA, pp. xx-xxi.
^'*Powell, "Commissars in the Economy," Asian Survey
,
3
(March 1965), pp. 125-138.
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state. Since then, the army's formidable influence and
presence have been maintained in every walk of life through
the nationwide "three- support" and "two-military" campaign.
The campaign mobilizes the army to support the broad masses
of the left, industry, agriculture, and to obtain military
control . ^ ^
In April 1969, it was speculated that Lin Biao and his
military followers even went so far as to force Mao and the
already crippled Party to acquiesce at the Ninth Party
Congress in the proclamation of Lin Biao as the official
successor to Mao in the new Party Constitution. Later, Mao
complained bitterly that the fine tradition of unified
leadership by the Party and the primacy of "the Party
controlling the gun" had been undermined by the PLA '
s
enhanced position of power. ^^ It is no exaggeration to
suggest that by 1969, the military had virtually taken over
the power of the Party and had practically imposed military
rule over the entire nation.
The the military's growing domination over the political
system followed the outbreak of the CR is clearly reflected
in the membership compositions of the major political
organizations at the time. Strong military representation
was evident at all levels from 1967 through 1971, prior to





the purge of Lin Biao and his generals. '' For instance, in
the powerful Political Bureau of the Ninth Central Committee
reorganized in April 1969, 13 out of a total 25 seats went
to military leaders (See Table I below). At the provincial
level, the generals headed nearly three quarters of all the
Party committees and revolutionary committees (see Table II
below)
.
The large-scale military intervention in the most
chaotic years of 1967 and 1968 was apparently viewed by Mao
and the Party as a matter of necessity for political order
and social discipline. But even after the Ninth Party
Congress and the reestablishment of local Party committees,
which took place at the provincial level between November
24, 1970, and August 19, 1971, the dominance of the army
persisted (see Table III below). The representation of the
PLA in the Provincial Party committee leadership was even
greater than it had been in the provincial revolutionary
committees, which had been organized earlier during the
period of greatest disorder between January 31, 1967 and
September 5, 1968. In 1970 when the operations of some
central ministries were restored, among the 25 ministerial
heads who could be identified, as many as 20 had been
dispatched by the military. ^^
^
'James R. Townsend, Politics China, 2nd edition,




MILITARY IN THE POLITBURO
8th CC 9th CC 10th CC 11th CC 12th CC
Year 1956 1969 1973 1977 1982
Total 23 25. 16 26 28
Military 6 13 3 10 9
% Military 26 52 19 38 30
Note: Total members including alternate members.
CC: Central Committee.
Source: Townsend,
Politics China, Table XIII, p. 268.
Record of Chinese Communist Personnel
,
(Taipei:
National Political University, International Relations
Center, 1978), P. al71.





^^Ting Wang, "The Emergence Military Class", in William
Whitson, ed. , The Military and Political Power in China in
the 1970s
,
(New York: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1972), p.
118.
^^See a very detailed study on the phanomonon of the
interlocking directorate by Monte Bullard, China ' s Political
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TABLE II
PROVINCIAL- LEVEL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES, 1968
Total Military Other
Chairmen 29 19 (66%) 10 (34%)
1st VC 29 22 (76%) 7 (24%)
Chairmen and
all VC 220 94 (43%) 126 (57%)
Note: Military member including the political
commissars «
1st VC: First Vice Chairmen
VC: Vice Chairmen





1 (January 1969), pp. 6-8.
The interlocking directorship^^ between the Party and
the military had long been a salient feature designed for
exercising dual control of the army, but the phenomena of
the late 1960 's which were similar in appearance were
totally different in substance. The practice in the
mid-1950 's called for the provincial- level first Party





PROVINCIAL LEVEL CCP COMMITTEES, 19 71
Total Military Other
1st Secretaries 29 20 (69%) 9 (31%)
All Secretaries 158 ' 94 (59%) 64 (41%)
Note: Military members including the political
commissars
.
CCP : Chinese Communist Party
Source
:
Harry Harding, "China: The Fragmentation of Power,"
Asian Survey
,
1 (January 1972), p. 3.
secretaries to serve concurrently as political commissars of
their local military regions or districts.''" Now the
direction of penetration and control was completely
reversed: it was the military commanders and commissars who




In the wake of Lin Biao's abortive coup in September
1971, Mao and the Party began to undertake strenuous efforts
to scale down the dominance of the PLA and to restore Party
supremacy. By the early spring of 1973, a total of 48 top
provincial- level Party leaders (5 first secretaries, 3
second secretaries, and 40 secretaries or deputy
secretaries) had been removed. Among them were 35 military
commanders and political commissars (representing 73% of
those dismissed)."*^ Of the 195 full members and 124
alternate members of the Tenth CC elected in August 1973,
the PLA accounted for only about 30 percent (see Table IV
below). In the 25-member Politburo, the loss of military
representation was even sharper between 1969 and 1973, when
it fell from 52 percent to 19 percent, (see Table I ) . " ^ An
unprecedented large-scale reshuffle of top military
commanders (more than 40 ranking officers associated with
Lin were purged) included the Chief -of - Staff of the PLA,
political commissars of general logistics, the air force,
and the navy . "* ^ In the fall of 1975, another large-scale
transfer of military personnel took place, involving 83
'*^Paris H. Chang, "Changing Patterns of Military Role in
the Chinese Politics," in William Whitson, ed., The Military
and Political Power in China in the 1970s
,
(New York:
Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1972), pp. 47-70.
"*
^My own calculation based on Bullard's "Appendix E: PRC
Elites Holding Interlocking Positions," pp. 241-252.
"^'Wang, p. 160.
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leaders. Again they were relieved of their previous Party
and administrative positions.'*'* These moves clearly
demonstrated Mao's determination to further weaken the power
base of the PLA and to put them under the tighter control of
the Party. While the military leaders were being purged or
transferred out of the civilian posts in large numbers,
Party and veteran cadres were quickly appointed to fill the
vacated posts. However, as will be discussed later, a large
number of Party leaders who were purged under military
stewardship during the CR have been rehabilitated in the
past dozen years.
While the balance between the civil and military
personnel was being readjusted after the Lin Biao incident,
Mao also launched a series of mass campaigns to help rectify
the PLA's excessive expansion of power and function. The
movement to "Learn form the PLA" in the 1960 's was matched
by a new campaign based on the slogan, "learn from the
people of the whole country." The Three Main Rules of
Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention were reissued
in early 1972 in conjunction with the PLA's campaigns to
study and eliminate its arrogance and disobedience.'*^ The
PLA was instructed to place equal emphasis on military and







MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE CC
8th CC 9th CC 10th CC 11th CC 12th CC
Year 1956 1969 1973 1977 1982
CC 21% 457o ' 30% 27% 19%
Note: CC stands for the Central Committee
Source: Hong Yung Lee, "China's 12th Central Committee,
Asian Survey
,
6 (June 1983), p. 679.
to "put politics to the fore" during the CR, the PLA was
told that "politics must be in command of and lead military
affairs.""^ Although actions taken by Mao to curb the
military did show considerable effect, statistically at
least, in redressing the balance of power in favor of the
Party, the fact remains that about one third of all the
membership in key organs of power at the central and
provincial levels were still controlled by military
commanders and commissars. The excesses of military control
and its monopoly of political power have apparently been
'Kau, LPA, p. xiv.
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reduced, but, as will be shown later, the battle for
political primacy remained inconclusive.
G. FACTIONALISM: AN INSTITUTIONAL NORM
Since the early years of the Communist movement, the
leadership has been confronted with the serious problems of
organizational discipline and the style of work in the Red
Army. As early as 1929 at the Ku-t'ien Conference, Mao
talked at length about such problems as the disregard of
organizational discipline, individualism, and the
roving-rebel mentality .'* ' That factionalism, sectarianism,
mountaintopism, departmentalism, and plittism were among
some of the most frequently cited troubles which plagued the
unity and operational efficiency of the Communist forces is
well documented and elaborated in numerous Party literature
and documents. These behaviors stemmed primarily from
personal ambitions for power and status, unprincipled
rivalries among small groups and cliques based on personal
loyalties and ties, or competition among various
organizations and institutions for promoting and protecting
different vested interests or policy orientations.
To cope with these organizational problems, from the
early years onwards enormous efforts were made by leaders
like Mao, Liu Shaoqi , and Chen Yun to lay down elaborate
'*^This information is taken from Prof. Huff's class
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organizational rules and to devise institutional structures
and operational processes for the Party and the Army . "* ^
During the civil wars and the early 1950's, the urgency
of military operations and post-war construction must have
helped to keep power rivalries and political disputes at a
lower level, making it easier to contain them within the
framework of established institutional arrangements. But,
factional politics based on personal loyalties and sectarian
interests had not been eliminated. As Andrew Nathan had
eloquently argued with massive documentation, factionalism
never ceased to play a significant role, though at times
latently, in the political and administrative processes of
the Party and the military high command.'*^
The outburst of power struggle during the CR cannot be
considered in isolation from the special context of
political disputes and factional relationships of the early
sixties,^" In fact, historical hindsight further shows that
the sources of all struggles dated far back to the guerrilla
years during which the Communist forces were divided between
the "red bases" and the "white areas," and the Red Army was
'•^Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for the CCP
Politics," The China Quarterly
,





^"Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese Cultural
Revolution
,
(Berkeley: University of California Press,
1973), pp. 1-6.
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broken down into autonomous and separate guerrilla columns.
The legacy of personal contacts and loyalties developed
through the common experience of the war years tend to have
had a long lasting effect in shaping the patterns of
personal as well as political associations and mutual
commitments in the post-war years. As William Parish has
pointed out, these personal relationships tends to emerge
and exert greater influence in the political arena when the
formal structures and ideological consensus have been
weakened by political crisis. ^^
In the early sixties, Mao's efforts to cultivate special
ties with Lin Biao and to enlist the support of the PLA were
clearly related to his frustration and inability to return
to the "first front" after having suffered a major political
setback in 1959. The repeated failure to regain his control
of the Party through the Socialist Education Campaign
(1962-1963) and the "Four Clean-ups" (1965-66) apparently
reoriented his antagonism to the Liu-Deng group from a
policy viewpoint to a factional perspective.^^ Clearly, it
was under these circumstances that Mao began to abandon the
normal procedures and channels of the political process and
went outside the system by moving to Shanghai to seek
^
^William Parish, "Faction in Chinese Military




extraordinary means of remedy and unconventional sources of
support. He resorted to conspiring with the radicals and
forming alliances of a factional nature with selected
military leaders. This strategy of factional politics
eventually proved to be useful for defeating his enemies,
the "revisionest" power holders, through the turmoil and
violence of the CR. But at the same time Mao created a
worse dilemma for himself: Lin and his generals took
advantage of the escalation of the factional politics that
Mao had unleashed to conduct their own factional politics
for strengthening and expanding their own power.
The details and mysteries surrounding Lin's coup attempt
remain to be uncovered and studied. A careful reading of
the. available documentation regarding the case, however,
conveys a distinct impression that divergence and tension
over policy and ideology notwithstanding, the thrust of the
life-and-death struggle was most likely triggered by the
factional struggle for power and security between Mao and
Lin. Its major impetus flowed from the chain of actions and
reaction, challenges and responses which stemmed from the
escalation of power balancing and political struggle. The
problem was further compounded by the absence of a
well-defined or institutionalized process of political
succession. As a result the successor-designate was forced
to consolidate his power base, and such efforts ran counter
to Mao's jealously guarded power and authority. Having
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aroused Mao's anger and suspicion with reguard to his
loyalty, Lin saw no alternative but to attempt to seize
power by force and conspiracy to insure his own survival. ^^
The downfall of Lin Biao and the purge of a large number
of his close associates does not necessarily mean that the
crisis of factional politics was also arrested. In fact,
the large scale arrest and punishment of political suspects
almost certainly planted more seeds for future
factional conflict.
Developments in the 1970s indeed suggest a prevailing
mood of tension, uncertainty, and anxiety in the nation.
Since the demise of Lin Biao, waves of politically- charged
mass campaigns have been launched one after another with
unusal rigor. The campaign to "Go Against The Tide" and
"Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius" of 1973 and 1974 were
followed successively by those to "Study the Theory of
Proletarian Dictatorship," "Restrict Bourgeois Rights,"
"Criticize Song Jiang," and "Revolutionize Education" in
1974 and 1975.^'* Although these campaigns was couched in
ideological and policy terms, they were also directed at
those leaders who might be identified with such wrong views
5 3 Kau , LPA, pp. xxiii-xxix
^
"Paris H. Chang, "China: Politics and Policies, Mao's
Last Stand?" Problems of Communism , 4 (September-October
1977), pp. 4-11.
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and policies, or at those who were simply viewed by the
Maoists as disloyal or ambitious.
H. POST-MAO: DENG AND THE PLA TO THE 12TH PARTY CONGRESS
Since Mao's passing and the purge of the Gang of Four,
PRC ' s elites have continued to clash over a wide range of
important political and economic issues involving both
ideology and power. Although Hua Guofeng succeeded Mao as
Party Chairman in October 1976, he had great difficulties
consolidating his power. See Chapter III for detail on the
rise and fall of Hua Guofeng. Despite Hua's claim that he
was Mao's hand-picked successor, his previous training and
experience were limited. Furthermore, Hua's rapid rise to
political prominence was at the expense of many
distinguished veteran officials (including Deng Xiaoping)
who were victimized by Mao.
Military cadres continued to form a large proportion of
the new leadership elected at the 12th CCP National Congress
in September 1982 although the proportion was slightly
smaller than that of the 11th CCP Central Committee in
August 1977. Of the 25 members and three alternate members
of the Politburo elected at the First Plenum of the 12th CCP
Central Committee, 12 (42.8%) were military men.^^ They
^ ^Military men in this discussion are those have either
served as uniformed soldiers or political commissars
assigned to the military units.
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were: Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Yang Dezhi, Wang Zhen, Xu
Xiangquian, Nie Rongzhen, Yang Shangkun, Yu Qiuli, Wei
Guoqing, Li Desheng, Zhang Tingfa, and Qin Jiwei.^^ Of the
newly elected Central Committee members, 58 (28.1%) were
military cadres serving in combat units or in the national
defense industry system or were cadres who have military
ranks and may return to the army someday. Of the newly
elected alternate members of the CCP Central Committee, 26
out of 129 (20%) were serving officers. ^^
The high percentage of military cadres in the CCP
Central leadership posed a great threat to the Deng faction.
Although Deng Xiaoping had been chairman of the Central
Military Commission (CMC), the highest commanding post in
the PLA, since the Sixth Plenum of the 11th CCP Central
Committee, a strong anti-Deng force still existed in the
army which was composed of followers of conservatives, the
"Whateverists" and the Maoists. ^^ Quite a few military
leaders were neutralized by being elected to the Central
Advisory Commission at the 12th Congress. Others, who may
have opposed certain aspects of his plan, were isolated and








5 7 deB. Mills, p. 28
^^Paris H. Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent
Quest," Problems of Communism , • (January-February 1981), p.
4, thereafter, Chang, "Deng's Turbulent Quest".
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political commissars, and commanders of 29 Military
Districts/Garrison, only a mere 7 out of a total 51
appointments were made prior to June 1981.^^ Some of the
more important removals included Geng Biao (defense
minister) , Xu Shiyou (member of the Standing Committee of
the CCPCMC), Zhang Caiqian (commander of Wuhan MR), Nie
Fengzhi (commander of Nanjing MR), Li Zhenfeng (first
political commissar of Wuhan MR), Wu Kehua (commander of
Guangzhou MR), Xiao Wangdong (first political commissar of
Jinan MR), and Xu Liqing (first political commissar of
Chengtu MR) . ^ ° Meanwhile, the die-hard Deng supporter Yang
Shangkun took actual charge of the Central Military
Commission (CMC) as vice-chairman of its Standing
Committee. ^^ The substitution of Yu Qiuli for Wei Guoqing as
director of the General Political Department (GPD) of the
PLA and the substitution of Zhang Aiping for Geng Biao as
defense minister were also indications that a continued
power struggle and contradictions still existed in the




Supplement : PRC ' s Official Activities
and Monthly Bibliography . (Hamburg: Institute of Asian
Affairs, September 1984), pp. 43-44.
^
"These are just some of the names obtained by comparing









^Richard D. Nethercut , "Leadership in China Rivalry,





segment of the PLA to certain of Deng Xiaoping' s reforms
(Deng himself having served considerable time as a military
leader) has resulted in the modification or postponement of
several of these reforms. On others, PLA resistance has had
little or no effect. Radical revolutionary sentiment within
the PLA has thus far been successful in blocking the
reinstitution of military ranks, a measure strongly favored
by Deng and professionally oriented elements of the
military. ^^ In the summer of 1982, an incident must have
caused considerable embarrassment; the official news agency
issued a Chinese- language transmission of a speech by Yang
Dezhi, chief of the PLA's general staff. Among other
matters, Yang was quote as saying that "in order to
strengthen the modernization program in the army, we are
planning to reinstitute a system of military ranks." Four
hours later, Xinhua re-broadcast Yang's speech in both
English and Chinese. The transmissions were identical to
the earlier broadcast except the sentence on reinstitut ing
ranks was omitted.^"
Deng, it will be remembered, was rehabilitated with the
help of certain elements within the army. Chief among them
are believed to be Ye Jianying, Wei Guoqing, and Xu Shiyou.
^^Chang Ching-wen "Peking's Restoration of Military
Ranks," Issues and Studies , 8 (August 1984), p. 5
'" Xinhua
,
Beijing, 21 August 1981 in FBIS-China , 24
August 1981, p. U/1-2.
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All three are old soldiers of considerable repute: Ye, one
of the original ten marshals of the PRC ; Wei, head of the
GPD of the PLA; and Xu Shiyou , commander of the Guangzhou
Military Region.®^ Given Deng's outspoken comments on
military professionalism during the years before he was
purged, it must be assumed that those who helped in his
rehabilitation were sympathetic to at least some of his
views. Yet within a few years after his rehabilitation,
Deng's policies, deMaoization, lowered military
modernization priority, and economic liberization, brought
him into conflict with all of them.
Ye Jianying, thought to have argued forcefully for a
modification of the deMaoification process, believed that
otherwise troop morale would be irreparably damaged. In
addition to his private statements. Ye pointedly absented
himself from important meetings on several occasions, thus
causing much public speculation.^^ Wei Guoqing, as a
consequence of his position as head of the GPD and much
concerned with matters of ideology and morale, clearly sided
with Ye. Other of Deng's policies, such as his campaign to
"seek truth from facts" (a part of the deMaoification
process) downgraded the role of ideology and therefore
affected Wei's and the GPD's interests. Wei also vigorously





Tokyo, 13 February 1981 in FBIS-Ghina
,
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February 1981, p. L/1.
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opposed Deng's liberalization of art and literature, fearing
a deleterious effect on army discipline and morality. It
will be remembered that the attack on liberalization was
begun by Liberation Army Daily under the direction of Wei's
GPD.^^ Xu Shiyou's disaffection with Deng stemed from these
and at least one other source: he apparently wished to be
named defense minister, but Geng Biao was appointed to the
position instead.
Deng Xiaoping 's chief supporters in the army may be
assumed to have included Yang Dezhi, Deng's choice as chief
of the PLA ' s general ' staff
;
Qin Jiwei , commander the Beijing
Military Region; and Zhang Tingfa, the chief of the PLA's
air force. All have spoken out against "leftism in the
army , " ^ ^ and Zhang has, in addition urged the military to
"avoid endless quibbling over matters of the past. . .and
look forward into the future. "^^
Ye Jianying recently announced his retirement "from the
first line'"" of duty, and Xu Shiyou was removed as
^^Ellis Joffe, "Party and Military in China:
Professional In Command?" Problems of Communism
,
(September-October 1983), pp. 56-57 and 60-61.
^
^ Renmin Ribao, 4 April 1981, in FBIS-China , 7 April
1981, p. K/18.
^'Ban Yue Tan, Beijing, 10 August 1981, in FBIS-China
,
18 August 1981, p. K/20.
^ °Wen Hui Po , 1 May 1982 in FBIS-China , 9 May 1982, p.
U/1.
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commander of the Guangzhou MR.^^ Yet both remained
personally powerful and were presumed to command the
loyalties of substantial segments of the military. Wei
Guoqing retained both his institutional and his personal
power base after his removal in August 1982.
In the opinion of one former State Department analyst,
the military's ideological debates of 1981-1982 produced no
clear winner or prevailing line.^^ The professionalist
,
pro-Deng group within the military had increased its power
but still needed the support of others, and will make
concessions; though not necessarily permanent ones, to gain
its support . ^ ^ Meanwhile, debate is likely to continue on
Deng's policies and plans.
I. SUMMARY: THE SITUATION IN 1982
In the realm of political transformation, as long as the
leadership continues to be committed to the goal of
continued revolution and presses for radical change in
political values, social structure, and policy priorities,
"class enemies" and political opposition are bound to
^^Hung-mao Tien, The Communist Party of China : Party
Powers and Group Politics from the Third Plenum to the
Twelfth Party Congress
,
(Baltimore: School of Law,
University of Maryland Press, 1984), p. 23.
^
^Richard D. Nethercut , "Deng and the Gun:






emerge. Their emergence would naturally entail the need for
the military to shoulder the extramilitary burdens of social
reform and political control in support of the Party's quest
for class struggle. During times of extensive political
instability, the coercive power of the military is always
needed to ensure internal security and to buttress political
authority. The loyalty and subordination of the military to
the revolutionary leadership under such circumstances
becomes a prerequisite for political stability and the
implementation of reform. However, as shown in this
chapter, a close examination of the record prior to 1980
reveals some serious built-in problems in the role of the
military. One of the powerful forces at work which will
certainly strongly challenge the role of the military is the
general trend toward institutionalization and
professionalization that China has been experiencing since
1949 in every sector of the society. Institutionalization
and professionalization are bound to enhance the influence
and authority of professionals and bureaucrats. Within the
PLA, the conflict between "red" and "expert" and between
political work and military work has been evident for many
year. There is no question that the continued advancement
in military technology, especially since the PRC initiated
her "open door" policy, is going to push the PLA further in
the direction of specialization and centralization. In a
more advanced, modernized stage, the responsible military
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professionals cannot but view the diversion of the PLA to
nonmilitary activities as dysfunctional and
counterproductive for national security.
The record shows further that efforts to enlist the
military for the performance of non-military tasks carry
tremendous risks and consequences. Such efforts tend to
upset the proper balance of Party-army relation, especially
the ideal of Party supremacy and control over the military.
Calling on the armed forces to share power or form a
partnership in domestic politics for the purpose of
sustaining the political system in crisis almost inevitably
leads to a military takeover of the Party and government.
Worse still, the involvement of the military in power
struggles and political intrigue not only would factionalize
and destroy the unity of the high command of the military
but also would help spur the escalation of factional
politics in other sectors of society.
Despite some success in reducing the power of the
military and checking the factional struggle in recent
years, a complete victory in restoring the correct
Party-military relationship is by no means assured or in
sight. Conversly, this does not mean that its political
influence will remain at a lower ebb. It may very well be
that the present Deng leadership is being given some time to
show positive results with its policies. If such results
are not forthcoming and if their effects are not felt in the
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defense sphere, the military arm of the Party may reassert
itself on policy and leadership issues. The military is
still very powerful and omnipresent, and it will surely
remain so in the years ahead. The role of the military as a
key political player is now indisputable. Party leaders can
not afford to ignore its voice nor can they survive
politically without its approval and support.
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III. POWER BASE : THE CASE OF HUA VS DENG
1976 was a year of death and destruction in more ways
than one. Zhou Enlai passed away in January; Zhu De died in
June; and Mao Zedong died in September 1976. Deng Xiaoping
was purged in April and the Gang of Four was locked up in
October. Violent demonstrations broke out in the heart of
Beijing early in April and an earthquake devastated the area
around Tangshan on 28 July 1976.'''' Following the death of
Mao and the purge of the Gang of Four, Hua Guofeng emerged
triumphantly from a relative unknown figure to the Chairman
of the CCP, Chairman of the Military Commission of the
CCPCC, and the head of the government of the PRC . Very few
China watchers would have predicted at that time that in
less than three years he would fall from power and that in
less than five years would drop completely from the
political arena while Deng Xiaoping, the twice-purged
"capitalistic roader" , would return to dominate the
political scene. ^^ The process by which this reversal
^''For more detail see Jurgen Domes "The 'Gang of Four'-
and Hua Guofeng: Analysis of Political Events in
1975-1976," The China Quarterly
,
71 (September 1977), pp.
473-477.
^^Parris H. Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent
Quest", Problems of Communism
,
(January-February 1981), pp.
1-23. Also Chang, "The Last Stand of Deng's Revolution",
Journal of Northeast Asia Studies
,
June 1982, pp. 3-19.
Richard D. Nethercut , "Deng and the Gun: Party-Military
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occured raises many questions about the political
surviveability of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in a post-Deng
environment. This chapter focuses on the question of why
Hua, who controlled all the power positions, lost to someone
who had none. The very answers to these questions may also
be the solutions to a post-Deng's political arrangement for
a smooth succession.
A. . THE ROLE OF POWER BASE IN CHINESE POLITICS
Although the PRC is a communist state, political power
does not automatically rest on those individuals occupying
the key government or Party positions. The distinction of
formal and informal power must be conceptually identified in
the Chinese political arena. A high official in a key
position may have the formal power but no informal power.
Conversely, the head of a secret society or a Mafia family
may have informal power but no formal power. In either
case, the power is incomplete without having both. To a
considerable extent, a political actor's formal power base
rests on his informal power base. His informal power base
consists of an accretion of alliances forged during his
tours of duty in a series of formal positions. This series
of positions is known in Chinese as a person's "background
environment", beij ing . As in any life history, some
Relations in the PRC", Asian Survey , 8 (September 1982), pp
691-703.
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background experiences are more crucial than others in
forming strong ties. The most notable and durable bonds are
those established through years of shared sacrifice for a
cause and the camaraderie engendered by risking death
together or owing one's life to another. The less
celebrated but equally adhesive bonds are those background




relationship. But, these bonds, once forged, must
subsequently be cultivated if they are to become useful in
political power maneuvering. An official with a broad,
deep, and well-cultivated political base has a better chance
of political survival and success.
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUA
When Hua Guofeng^ ^ was transfered from Hunan to Beijing
in 1971, he was relatively unknown outside China and a
lesser known political figure in the PRC political arena.
For more than 20 years Hua had been a competent but low-key
provincial administrator. However, once in the political
center, he rose to become the first person in the PRC and
^^The background information contained in this section
is based on the following articles: Micheal Oksenberg and
Sai-cheung Yeung , "Hua Guofeng's Pre-Cultural Revolution
Hunan Years, 1949-1966: The Making of a Political
Generalist", The China Quarterly
, 69, (March 1977), pp.. 3-53
Domes, "the Gang and Hua"; Dorothy Grouse Fontana,
"Background to the Fall of Hua Guofeng," Asian Survey
,
3
(March 1982), pp. 237-259.
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CCP history to hold the premiership and the top Party and
military posts concurrently.
Hua was born to a poor family in Jiaocheng County in
1924 in central Shanxi. He joined the CCP anti- Japanese
guerrilla forces when he was 17 years old. His
anti- Japanese activities during the next 10 years were
unremarkable. In the fall of 1949, Hua was transferred
south to Hunan province where he headed a work team. During
this time he rose to the position of secretary of the
Yiangying county party committee. His opportunity to make
his mark came in 1951 when he was transferred within the
province to become a party secretary in Mao Zedong's home
county, Xiangtan. By 1955, he had been promoted to become
the ranking Party secretary of Xiangtan Special District.
When the GLF was launched in 1958, Hua was a provincial
vice-governor concerned with economic affairs. It was
believed that when Peng Dehuai attacked the GLF at Lushan,
Hua was the Hunan official who furnished information to help
Mao repudiate the charges . ^ ^ After the GLF, Hua continued to
be active in rural work. In addition, he widened his
experience by holding major responsibilities in the area of
education reform. He also spent a number of years in charge
of finance and trade work in Hunan which brought him into
^^Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics , 2nd edition, p
33.
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close contact with Li Xiannian, then the Finance Minister
and a Politburo member.
Little is known about Hua's activities during the CR.
In the summer of 1967, he became a leading member of a
preparatory group established to inaugurate the Hunan
provincial Revolutionary Committee. He was appointed as a
vice-chairman of the Committee when it was set up in 1968.
At the close of the CR, Hua's star was certainly on the
rise. In 1969, with high-level support from Beijing (most
likely from Li or Mao), he was able to outmaneuver the very
influential Hunan military leaders and be elected to the
CCPCC. In the 1970, when Party organizations throughout the
PRC began to be reconstituted and the political influence of
the military was reduced accordingly, Hua became the first
secretary of Hunan province. A year later, -in 1971, Hua was
called to Beijing and assumed work of national importance.
In 1973, he gained a seat on the Politburo of the CCPCC, and
in 1975 he acquired the additional posts of vice-premier and
Minister of Public Security.
C. HUA'S BEIJING: AN EVALUATION
The background of Hua Guofeng was significantly
different from those of other central political actors in
the PRC (with the exceptions of the Gang of Four) which is
one of the reasons it proved difficult to form an accurate
estimate of his strength. From the perspective of a
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bureaucratic career, his background was both "narrow" and
shallow.^* It was narrow in that his career experiences had
been highly specialized and his potential political base was
basically limited to one province and one functional system,
namely, agriculture Hunan province. In contrast, Deng
Xiaoping had experience that provided him with a political
base in the PLA, Party, and government, as well as with the
peasants and intellectuals. Whereas the narrow or broad
dimension refers to the functional scope of Hua's and Deng's
career experiences, the shallow or deep dimension refers to
their temporal duration. This depth may be indexed on the
basis of age and the number of years spent in the Party and
the other functional areas. A common Chinese phrase, "ru
chou wei gan de xiao zi " describes someone of shallow
experience (a rookie, or "wet behind the ears"). Literally,
it means that "the smell of your mother's milk is still
fresh on you." Most cadres occupying the central positions
have deep-rooted backgrounds that provide them with
potential supporters scattered through every echelon of the
hierarchy, especially at its upper levels. Hua's support,
however, was mainly confined to the province of Hunan with
some upper level support as a result of his legal position
^'See Lowell Dittmer's article "Bases of Power in
Chinese Politics: A Theory and An Analysis of The Fall of
the Gang of Four", in World Politics , 1 (October 1978), pp.
26-60.
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and his swift move to arrest of Gang of Four in 1976.^^ The
rise of Hua to the center of the PRC political spotlight did
not occur until 1971. Thus, bureaucratically speaking, he
was what Deng called a "helicopter."
Notwithstanding the lack of broad experience and
deep-rooted background, Hua commanded a strong political
coalition in 1976 while Deng plead for his return. Deng
wrote two letters to Hua, in October 1976 and in April 1977,
to acknowledge Hua's position as the supreme leader and
Mao's worthy successor to the CCP and PRC. Deng further
expressed his humble admission of previous mistakes and
requested he be assigned whatever work Hua might see fit
(see Section E, Chapter III for the full text of the
letter)
.
By September 1976, Hua seemed to have packed all the
ammunition on his side. A quick overview of his supporters
gave an appearance of great strength. The coalition under
Hua had predominant control of the Politburo and thus
control the Party decision-making mechanism. It also had
wide support from leftist Party cadres.'" One element of the
coalition was the Maoist "Whatever" faction, whose members
rose to political prominence during the CR and sought to
defend whatever policy Mao favored.'^ It also controlled
^^ Chang, "Deng's Revolution", p. 5.
'"Fontana, "Hua's Fall", pp. 243-244
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Beijing, and had complete access to the extensive and
sometimes embarrassing data on all Party members, as well as
access to Mao's complete works for use in stressing Hua's
legitimate inheritance from Mao. Another element of Hua's
coalition was the "oil" or "petroleum" faction, a group of
economists and technocrats who ran the Chinese economy under
the late Premier Zhou's stewardship during 1966- 1976.^^ The
support from this group provided Hua further influence in
government and economics. Reportedly, CCP Vice- Chairman Li
Xiannian was the behind-the-scenes leader of the "oil"
faction. ^ * In addition, Hua's coalition drew support from
Defense Minister Ye Jianying, further broadening his
strength with the military. Finally, Hua had the support of
the leftist Party cadres who had been promoted to power over
the heads of those purged during CR. Of the CCP ' s estimated
39 million members in 1976, 18 million had joined during the
years of CR.^"* Most of them had genuine reason to fear a
change of course by the rehabilitated leaders who attempted
to refute the legitimacy and legality of the younger
leftists who replaced them during CR. In fact, any attempt















by the rehabilitated cadres to negate the basic precepts of
the CR would undermine the political rationale that had
justified the existence of those leftist cadres. This, in
turn, made the leftist party cadres dependent on Hua to
defend the CR.
In addition to this coalition of supporters, Hua also
expended considerable energy to identify himself completely
with Mao. Among the first acts were to announce a burial
hall for Mao and the publication of volume V of Mao's
works .* ^ Great emphasis was placed on his being Mao's
"worthy successor" and Mao's personal choice. The famous
note Mao assertedly gave to Hua earlier in 1976 declaring
that "with you in charge, I'm at ease" was widely
publicized.*^ In addition, at the 1977 Party Congress, Ye
declared . that Hua was the man capable of "leading our
Party . . . triumphantly into the twenty-first century" and
thus of achieving the fundamental goal of socialist
modernization. ^ ^
'^"Decision on the Publication of the Selected Works of
Mao Zedong" and the "Preparations for the Publication of the
Collected Works of Mao Zedong" Beij ing Review
,
42 (15
September 1976), pp. 3-4.
*^
"Press Communique of the 11th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China", Beij ing Review 35 (26 August
1977), p. 11, and 36 (2 September 1977, ), p. 24.
*'
"Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution,"
Beijing Review 36 (2 September 1977), p. 11.
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D. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DENG
Deng Xiaoping, ^^ one of very few first generation CCP
leaders still alive, is, without a doubt, the most
influential actor on the current PRC political stage. Deng
was born in Sichuan province in 1904. When he was 16, he
studied in France under a joined work-study program. ^^ Among
the students who later become prominent in the CCP were Zhou
Enlai and Liu Xiaoqi . He returned to China in 19xx after
spending a few months in the Soviet Union. By 1931 he had
arrived at the communist base in Jiangxi where he served as
propaganda officer. In 1936 he joined the Long March from
Jiangxi to Shaanxi . During the Sino- Japanese war of
1937-1945, Deng was the political commissar of the 129th
Division of the 8th Route Army. At the end of 1949 he was a
secretary of the Party's Southwest Bureau and political
commissar of the 2d Field Army in the Civil War. In 1952,
Deng moved to Beijing to become a Vice-Premier and a member
of the State Planning Commission. In September 1953 he was




Wang, pp. 36-38; Hong-yung Lee, "Deng Xiaoping' s Reform of
the Chinese Bureaucracy," Journal of Northeast Asia Studies
,
2 (June 1982), pp. 21-35
Michael Ng-Quinn, "Deng Xiaoping' s Political Reform and
Political Order", Asian Survey , 12 (December 1982), pp.
1187-1205.
'^Nora Wang, "Deng Xiaoping: the Years in France," The
China Quarterly , 92 (December 1982), pp. 698-705.
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and Economic Commission of the central government. During
the mid-1950s, Deng rose to become a member of the powerful
CCPCC Politburo. At the Eighth CCP Party Congress in 1956,
he was promoted from the lowest ranking member on the
Politburo of 13 to sixth ranking on the Politburo of 17. He
also became General Secretary of the newly established
Secretariat and was one of the youngest men on the CCPCC and
the only man to be a member of both bodies. Deng remained
the CCP's General Secretary until he was purged in 1966. As
a Politburo member. General Secretary of the CCP, and
Vice-Premier, Deng was the second highest victim of the CR
.
In 1973, apparently at the request of Zhou Enlai, Deng
returned to the center stage of PRC politics. By 1975 he
had not only regained his CCPCC positions but also was named
Vice-chairman of the Party's Military Affairs Commission,
and Chief of Staff of the PLA. For the first time in his
career, Deng had direct influence over the military at the
national level. As Zhou's illness progressed, Deng assumed
more of the responsibilities of the Premiership and was the
natural successor to Zhou. But, once again,
unpredictability, a hallmark of Mao era politics, resulted
in Deng's second purge in April 1976.^°
^
"
The Truth Behind Tienanmen Riot, (Taipei: Institution
of International Relations, 1976), Chinese.
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In contrast to Hua, Deng's power base was both broad and
deep. While Hua became " a rookie" in the CCPCC in 1973,
Deng had already served that same organization for 12 years.
Deng, a veteran of the Long March, had been the political
commissar of the 2nd Field Army, whereas Hua was strictly a
low level provincially oriented bureaucratic worker
throughout the war years. While Deng's post-war service,
until the CR, was entirely associated with national level
policy making as an important actor in national politics,
Hua worked diligently in the province of Hunan and was
basically an unknown national political actor.
E. DENG VS HUA
Let us examine how the power base worked for each during
the period from 1976- 1978.^^ For many obvious reasons, Hua
himself had little desire to see Deng restored. However
innocent he may have been in the events surrounding the
Tienan Men incident, it was an inescapable fact that Hua's
rise to the top coincided with Deng's fall from power. But,
as events from October 1976 to July 1977 indicated, Deng,
even though he had fallen from the top, had not lost the
support he had built up throughout the years of Party and
government service. At the Politburo level, he was backed
^^For the purpose of this discussion, the Third Plenum
of 11th CCP Party Congress, September 1978, marked the
official down fall of Hua. See Wang, p. 37, and Fontana,
pp. 244-249.
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by Xu Shiyou and Wei Guoqing (and possibly Ye Jianying as
well). In fact, after the Tienan Men incident, Deng took
refuge in the south under the protection of Xu Shiyou . ^ ^ At
the popular level, there was a flurry of wallposters in
January 1977, at the time of the first anniversary of Zhou
Enlai ' s death, which called for Deng's rehabilitation.'^
Heavy hints were also passed to foreign visitors by high
officials to the effect that Deng's return was imminent. It
was also speculated that some of Deng's Politburo supporters
resorted to a policy of noncooperation by refusing to attend
Politburo level meetings in Beijing until the question of
Deng was settled.'"* This was significant because that no
CCPCC meeting could be held to ratify formally the momentous
changes'^ of October 1976, until the decision to restore
Deng had been taken. '^ Deng facilitated his own return by
adopting a traditional humble demeanor. On 10 October 1976
Deng wrote a letter' ' to Hua stating his "wholeheartedly
9 2 Nethercut, p. 692
' Murgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC :
A Time of Transition
,
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p.
145.
"*Fontana, p. 246.
'^Namely, Hua's informal assumption of the CCP
Chairmanship and Chairmanship of CCPCC Military Affairs
Commission.
'^Fontana, p. 247.
'^"Two of Teng Hsiaoping's Letters to Hua Kuo-feng"
Issues and Studies, March 1984, pp. 94-96.
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support" of Hua as CCP Chairman and Chairman of the CCPCC
Military Affairs Commission. The letter read:
To Comrade Guofeng and the Central Committee in Care of
Comrade Dongxing
:
I wholeheartedly support the Central Committee's
decision concerning Comrade Guofeng' s assumption of the
Chairmanship of the Party's Central Committee and the
Chairmanship of the Military Affairs Commission. I hail
this extremely important decision as of great
significance to the Party and the cause of socialism.
Not only Comrade Guogfeng is politically and
ideologically the best suitable successor to Chairman
Mao, but age-wise he can also ensure the stability of
the proletarian leadership to last for fifteen or twenty
years. How important is this to the whole Party, the
whole army and the people throughout the country, and
how could it fail to make people feel exultant! The
recent struggle to abate the careerists' plot to usurp
the Party and seize power occurred at a crucial moment
immediately following the passing away of the great
leader Chairman Mao. The Central Committee headed by
Comrade Guofeng vanquished those bad elements and
achieved a great victory. This is the victory of the
proletariat over the bourgeoisie. This is the victory of
the socialist road over the capitalist road. This is
the victory to consolidate the dictatorship of the
proletariat and to prevent capitalism from restoration.
This is the victory to consolidate the great cause of
the Party. And this is the victory of Mao Zedong
Thought and Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. Like all
the people throughout the country, I feel extremely
happy about the victory of this great struggle and I
cannot refrain from hailing aloud Long Live, Long Live,
and Long Live. I use this brief letter to express the
sincere feelings of my heart. Long Live the Great




With considerable reluctance, Hua gave way. In March
1977, during a Central Work Conference in Beijing, Hua made
an announcement that Deng had nothing to do with the Tienan
Men Incident. He went on stating that Deng had both
achievements and mistakes on his record during the period
when he was in charge in 1975 and that the CCPCC would give
him an opportunity to work again. ^' On 24 March Li Xiannian
informed a British editor that Deng had served China well in
the past and still had much to give the country. On 10
April Deng wrote again to Hua and Ye, expressing his deep
grief and profound mourning at Mao's passing. He also
admitted that he had made mistakes in 1975 and was grateful
and appreciative of the help Mao had given him to correct
his mistakes. Deng further expressed his gratitude and
promised to abide by whatever decision the CCPCC might make
with regard to the time and the type of work he should be
given. The full text of his letter is as follows: ^^
Chairman Hua, Vice- Chairman Ye, and the Central
Committee
:
I completely support Chairman Hua's recent talks at the
Central committee Work Conference; and completely
support Chairman Hua's fundamental policy of "grasp the
key link of class struggle and bring about great order
across the country" as well as the measures to take care
of various immediate issues and related working




^^"Two of Teng Hsiaoping's Letters to Hua Kuo-feng", pp.
95-96.
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1975, there certainly were shortcomings and mistakes.
Once again, I express my sincere acceptance of the great
leader and great teacher Chairman Mao's' criticism and
guidance to me. I am grateful to the Central
Committee's clearance that I had nothing to do with the
Tienan Men Incident. I am particularly glad that
Chairman Hua affirmed in his talks that the activities
of the broad masses of people at Tienan Men on last
year's Tomb- Sweeping Day were reasonable. As to the
issue of my own work--what will be the suitable work for
me to do and to begin at what time, I shall completely
obey the Central Committee's deliberation and
arrangement. Upon the passing away of the great leader
and great teacher Chairman Mao, I have expressed in
writing to the Central Committee my heartfelt grief and
profound mourning. Generation after generation we must
use Mao Zedong Thought to lead our whole Party, whole
army, and all the people throughout the country in order
to victoriously push forward the cause of the Party and
socialism as well as the cause of international
Communism. Upon the Central Committee's decision to
have Comrade Hua Guofeng to assume the Chairmanship of
the Party's Central Committee, and upon my knowing that
the Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua had won the
great victory to vanquish the "Gang of Four" by the most
brilliant, the most resolute, and most correct ways and
means, I have on October 10, 1976, expressed in writing
my sincere support and my feelings of exultation to
Comrade Hua Guofeng and the Central Committee.
Deng Xiaoping
April 10, 1977
After the initial round of political power play, the
third Plenum of the Tenth Party Congress convened from 16 to
21 July 1977, and the following three major objectives were
accomplished: 1. unanimous confirmation of Hua's
appointments as conferred by the Politburo in October 1976;
2. restoration of Deng to all his posts, including
Vice-chairman of the CCPCC, Vice-Chairman of the CCPCC
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Military Affairs Commission, and Chief of the General Staff
of the PLA; 3. expulsion of the "Gang of Four" from all
posts both inside and outside the Party and accusations that
they had "feverishly attacked and fabricated accusations
against Comrade Deng Xiaoping. " ^ "
°
Once back in the active political arena, Deng lost no
time consolidating his position, expanding his support base,
and challenging Hua's leadership. Several of Deng's close
associates, who had been purged in 1976, reappeared in July
|_g77 101
-phey were Hu Yaobang, Hu Qiaomu, Xi Zhongxun, and
Chen Yun. Immediately upon their return to active political
life, they began to reconstruct their political power bases.
The initial goals were to gain control of the Party and the
state bureaucratic apparatus while simultaneously nurturing
support at the provincial level. Hu turned his attention to
capturing the important office of the CCP bureaucratic
headquarters, the CCPCC ' s General Office. ^°^ The control of
this Party organization would be a critical step toward
faster rehabilitation of Deng's purged supporters, and
^°°The Communique of the Third Plenum of the Tenth Party
Congress can be found in Beij ing Review
,
29 July 1977, pp.
3-8.
^°^Shu-shin Wang, "Hu Yaobang: New Chairman of the




^°^See Wang's Contemporary Chinese Politics
,
1985, for
the evolution of the CCPCC's General Office and its
description, PP. 81-82, and Ibid., pp. 809-810.
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subsequently would facilitate their return to key positions
in the Party, state and provincial institutions, all this
was directed toward building a network of support for Deng's
final showdown with Hua.
Understandably, the key position of the CCPCC General
Office was closely guarded by Hua. In fact, Mao had
handpicked Wang Dongxing, a close supporter of Hua, as the
office director. The initial penetration into the office
came when Hu was appointed Deputy Director of the General
Office at the Third Plenum of the 10th Party Congress. This
appointment placed Hu under Wang's direct supervision. In
October 1977, Hu moved a step towards direct confrontation
with Wang position by replacing Gou Yufeng, a Hua supporter,
as the head of the Organization Department in the General
Office. Hu probably corrected many erroneous charges made
by the Gang of Four, and many cadres were rehabilitated
through his efforts. The official announcement to
repudiate charges, and rehabilitate, Yang Shangkun, Bo Yibo
,
Tao Zhu , and Peng Dehuai was made during the Third Plenum of
the 11th Party Congress in December 1978. In spite of Hua's
opening statement that mass campaigns against the Gang of
Four were to be stopped, the Third Plenum, nontheless,
officially called for a thorough investigation of
individuals and incidents associated with the crime of Gang
of Four to commit conspiracy to usurp Party and state Taking
advantage of the growing number of rehabilitated cadres,
Deng quickly manipulated their appointments back to Party,
state, province, and local key positions. According to Hong
Yung Lee's account, from the 10th to the 11th Party
Congresses, 85 rehabilitated cadres returned, constituting
25% of the total 11th CCPCC membership . ^ ° ^ The Third Plenum
also promoted four senior veteran cadres to the Politburo,
gaving Deng's group a comfortable 44% of its total
membership.^"'' Other personnel changes and appointments were
even more revealing. Chen Yun was named in charge of a
100-member Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline,
which was to enforce discipline among Party members.
Furthermore, he was appointed to head an ad hoc Financial
and Economic Group, a body assigned overall responsibility
for PRC economic and financial policy. This was a highly
significant appointment in light Chen's reputation as a
highly regarded economist, and also as an outspoken critic
of Mao's economic programs . ^ ° ^ Thus, it was clear that by
^ °
^Hong Yung Lee, "China's 12th Central Committee,"
Asian Survey
,
6 (June 1983), p. 674.
^
°
'*The four senior veteran cadres are Chen Yun, Hu
Yaobang, Wang Zhen , and Deng Yingchao . Other Deng
supporters were: Wei Guoqing, Ulanhu, Fang Yi , Xu Shiyou , Wu
De , Geng Biao, and Peng Chong. This information is found by
using China Handbook
, 1979, pp. 120-121, and Fontana's
article, p. 239.
^"^For an account of Chen Yun's career and his role at
the Third Plenum, see Paris H. Chang's Power and Policy in
China, 2nd enlarged edition, (University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1978), pp. 138-139.
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the end of 1978, Deng had made considerable gains in the
Party organization.
In addition, Hu was named to the newly restored post of
CCPCC Secretary General and, concurrently, replaced a Hua
supporter, Zhang Pinghua, as Director of the CCPCC
Propaganda Department. As the Secretary General of the
CCPCC, Hu not only directed the Party headquarters but also
supervised Party organization at all levels on a daily
basis. In essence, Deng had clearly maneuvered Hu into the
pivotal position in the Party where he would be better able
to push and implement the programs and policies favored by
Deng.
F. HUA'S FINAL ATTEMPT
Understandably, Hua did not stand idle while Deng
pursued his strategy of capturing the key positions in the
Party, state, and provinces. Hua, resisting Deng's efforts,
on several occasions lent his support by visiting and
appearing in public with those officials under attack. ^°^ In
the same vein. Ye Jianying, the Chairman of the Fifth
National People's Congress Standing Committee in 1978, urged
his committee members to strive for national stability and
unity. Hua's and Ye ' s efforts to avert Deng's power base
^^
^Examples were Zeng Shaoshan and Xie Xuegong, Party
1st secretaries of Liaoning and Tianjin provinces
respectively. See Paris H. Chang, -"Deng's Solution", pp.
6-7.
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rebuilding were to no avail. The fragile and shallow
support Hua had rallied around himself since 1976 began to
crumble. Hua's inability to effectively counter Deng's
political comeback can be summerized as follows: First, Hua
had managed to convert his political capital among the
various contending political groups into high formal
positions for himself. These positions provided access to
collegeal alliances and to bureaucratic constituencies. Hua
used his new power to achieve some rather impressive policy
gains: arrest of the Gang of Four and the enunciation and
implementation of the "Four Modernizations" espoused by Deng
in 1975. Although Hua was able to appoint his supporters to
Party and government positions at various level, the
tendency was to put all his energies into political
maneuvering at the center, while Deng and the rehabilitated
veterans wrestled the key Party and state bureaucratic
positions away. Thus, Hua was unable to cultivate his
formal positions by building strong collegeal alliances or
by cultivating bureaucratic support networks. As a result,
he remained in but not of the bureaucracy.
Second, the dilemma Hua faced during his ascendent to
power was that on the one hand he had to legitimize his
power by promoting Mao's stature, but on the other hand, he
had to purge the very people Mao had personally supported
during the CR. In general, the political beneficiaries of
the CR would have had good reason to side with Hua. On the
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other hand, all victims of the CR would have had the natural
inclination to side with Deng. Because of Hua's dilemma,
except for the prominent leaders at the top^°^ and the
mid-level officials personally planted by Hua, most of the
other political beneficiaries of the CR tended to harbor
deep misgivings about Hua. Hence, this group of
disenchanted officials became easy targets to be influenced
by Deng ' s group
.
Third, an illusion of invulnerability was developed as a
result of Hua's self -promoted image as Mao's chosen
successor. Apparently, Hua had hoped that Mao's unique
charisma and prestige could be transferred. On 20 December
1976, Chen Yonggui praised Hua at the Second National
Conference to Learn from Dazhai in Agriculture: "Comrade
Hua is loyal to the Party and selfless .... The whole
Party, the whole army, and the people of all nationalities
throughout the country take tremendous pride in once again
having a wise leader of their own."^°^
In like manner other articles praised Hua's "magnificent
contributions, high proletarian mantle, political far
sightness, rich experience in struggle, and exceptional
^°'The four exceptions are: Wang Dongxing, Mao's former
bodyguard and commander of "8341" garrison troop; Chen
Xilian, commander of Beijing Military Region; Wu De
,
Mayor
of Beijing; and Ji Denggui
.
^°^"Crux of 'Gang of Fours' Crime to usurp Party and
State Power", Beij ing Review, 1 (7 January 1977), p. 31.
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organizational talent." On 9 May 1977, Ye asserted that Hua
had "carried on Chairman Mao's traditional style of
work."^°^ And, like Mao, Hua began to provide inscriptions
in his own calligraphy, reproduced for maximum circulation.
On 1 August 1977, the fiftieth anniversary of the founding
of PLA was marked by the publication of both Mao's and Hua's
photographs in soldier's uniform. ^^° Hua even modified his
appearance to resemble that of Mao. He attempted to confirm
his Marxist credentials by having "re-published" certain
articles he had written in his Hunan days. And most
importantly, on 15 April 1977, the fifth volume of Mao '
s
Selected Works edited by Hua was published . ^ ^ ^ This
illusion-building apparently resulted in Hua's losing touch
with reality and believing his own propaganda, and may
explain the fundamental mistake in his strategy of holding
on to power at the center while the foundation of his power
base eroded away
In sum, the status of Hua's power base on the eve of his
political eclipse consisted of the following: First, his
inability to convert his political capital by building a
^ °
^Yeh Chien-ying, "Report on the Revision of the Party
Constitution", Beijing Review
,
36 (2 September 1977), p. 24.
110 Domes, pp. 143-144
^^
^"Decision on the Publication of the 'Selected Works
of Mao Tsetung' and the Preparations for the Publication of
the 'Collected Works of Mao Tsetung", Beij ing Review , 42 (15
October 1976), pp. 3-4.
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strong Party and bureaucratic network; then, his dilemma of
legitimizing his position through Mao and purging some of
Mao's most loyal supporters which cost him the loyalty of
many mid-level CR beneficiaries; and finally, his illusion
that he could transfer Mao's power base to himself. This
proved to be devastating to Hua's own strategy of power base
building.
G. CONCLUSION
In examining the problems associated with the power base
in Chinese politics, this chapter has attempted to show that
the fate of Hua conformed to the immanent logic of this
substructure. The failure of Hua underlines the profound
importance of broad and deep backgrounds and reliable
political bases in PRC ' s political struggles. It may also
illuminate the situation of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang,
whose background is somewhat broader than that of Hua, but
not much deeper. Hu and Zhao rose to central leadership
much like Hua. Assuming Deng realizes his proteges'
precarious positions, the next chapter will be devoted to
Deng's attempt to build consensus that will, under the best
circumstances, avoid catastrophes and, under the worst





Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress (PC)
in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping has moved ahead with his
plan to develop a new generation of successors to carry out
his policies. It would be naive to think Deng's
considerable advances have been without periodic setbacks
during the past five years. Nonetheless, the process of
succession building clearly moved in a direction that
favored his leadership and policy positions. This chapter
will examine Deng's solutions. First, his policies of
distributing of power to his supporters within the Politburo
and other institutions to ensure a winning coalition.
Secondly, his policies of ideological redefinition and
economic reform will be analyzed. Finally, in the third
section, Deng's policies of military reform and their impact
on reducing the PLA's influence in the internal political
process
.
A. DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
Power distribution is neither an alien concept in the
western states nor an unethical practice in a democratic
government. What the communist states identify as power
distribution, the democratic western governments may call
"cabinet-building" or "executive appointments". By the
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Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, Deng had mounted a
successful offense by discrediting Hua's associates . ^ ^ ^ At
the Fifth Plenum in February 1980, Deng and his supporters
were able to remove the "little Gang of Four": Wang
Dongxing, Wu De , Ji Dengkui , and Chen Xilian.^^-' Then, in
the fall of 1980, Deng advanced a program to reform the
Party and government leadership systems . ^ ^ "* According to
this new program, the CC, the Central Advisory Commission
(CAC), and the CC Central Commission for Discipline were to
be invested with equal power and would, therefore,
counterbalance each other. If this new program worked as
proposed, it would end the original system of concentrating
power primarily in the CCPCC, CC Standing Committee and the
Politburo. The CC would become the "executive" branch of
the government to carry out the resolutions adopted by the
PC. The CAC was designated as a supervisory organ which
provided "suggestions, inspections and supervision." The
title of the "watchdog" of the government was given to the
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) which
had the responsibility of maintaining Party discipline and
'•^^ Shu- shin Wang, "Hu Yaobang: New Chairman of the
Chinese Communist Party," Asian Survey , 9 (September, 1982),
p. 809.
^'
'Chang, "Deng's Quest", pp. 9-10.
^
^
'•Ng-Quinn, "Deng's Xiaoping' s Political Reform and
Political Order," Asian Survey , 12 (December 1982), pp.
1187-1205.
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supervising the Party's work style. ^^^ All three
organizations were to be elected directly by the PC. In
essence, Deng had formulated a system which not only
redistributed power to individuals that basically supported
his policies, but also devised
,
in theory, a check and
balance structure much like that of U.S. system.
The policies advanced by Deng to distribute power within
the Party were generally known as the "1980 Reform program."
The idea was to remedy the shortcomings of the
over-concentration of power, and the overlapping of Party
and government . ^ ^ ^ Behind this Party line were Deng's
personal objectives to achieve the following goals: 1. to
consolidate his and his successors' power position by
transferring senior cadres to the CAC ; 2. to achieve a
faster power transfer and improve work efficiency through
the policy of selecting "younger" and "technically
competent" cadres to fill leadership posts; and 3. to create
an environment wherein the shackles of Mao Zedong's Thought
would gradually becomes a thing of past . ^ ^ ^ Naturally,
Deng's programs provoked considerable criticism from the
existing Party leadership. Unexpectedly, however, his
programs also attracted strong opposition from some of the
^^^See Wang chapter 4, pp. 102-138 for more detailed
description of the functions of these three offices.
'''Chang, "Deng's Reform," p. 11.
' '
^Hong Yong Lee, pp 676-677.
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rehabilitated leaders . ^ ^ ' The main source of resistance to
the reforms within the Party came from senior cadres who
refused to take a back seat in the CAC . For instance, at
the 12th PC, Ye Jianying stated:
Before the Party CC decides to ask me to exit, I'll
perform my duties with all my efforts. I'll devote
myself to the state, body and soul, and stop only when I
die.^^^
Chen Yun, the highly regarded rehabilitated economist and a
close supporter of Deng's economic reform from 1978-1981,
said:
As there are not many young cadres qualified to take
over leadership posts, it is impossible to ask all the
old cadres to retire from their posts at the same time.
To meet practical needs, some old cadres still have to
stay on the front line."^^"
As a result of this powerful septuagenarian opposition to
'Deng's reforms. Ye together with 15 other senior Party
cadres aged over 70, were re-elected to the CCPCC Politburo
at the 12th Party Congress in September 1982.^^^ Of greater






'Renmin Ribao, Sept 7, 1982, p. 4
12 Renmin Ribao , September 7, 1982, p. 2
^ ^ ^ China Handbook , 1983, p. 133, the other cadres aged
over 70 were: Li Xiannian, Yang Shangkun, Zhang Tingfa,
Peng Zhen, Li Desheng, Liao Changchi , Wang Zhen, Wei
Gouqing, and Ulanhu.
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. Our military comrades should remember, during the
1964 political work conference, I had brought up the
question of promoting younger military cadres. At that
time, the aging problem wasn't very urgent, but there
was evidence of the aging problem .... Since then, 18
years have gone by . . . this question of replacing
aging military cadres steadily becomes a grave
concern. ^ ^ ^
Although some of the aging cadres were admittedly Deng's
allies on many issues, Table V clearly demonstrates the
seriousness of the aging problem which, in turn, indicates
the strong opposition force to Deng's reforms.
Notwithstanding the opposition at the inner circle of
the power structure, an the last day of the 12th PC, the
Party Congress spokesman, Zhu Mozhe, reported that the new
CCPCC had been elected in line with the new cadre policy.
He also gave the following statistics on the new members:
Sixty percent of the total members and alternate members
were elected for the first time. Of these 211
first-time elected members and alternate members, more
than two-thirds (140) were below 60 years old. The
number of professional technicians rose from the
previous 2.7% (9) to 17% (59). ^^3
^^^Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping .
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The 12th PC may not prove to have been a total success for
Deng, but, based upon the turnover in the Politburo and the
assignments of functional areas of responsibilities, Deng
certainly scored an important victory in his effort to
consolidate power.
The 12th NPC Standing Committee was packed with
rehabilitated old cadres, almost all of whom were Deng's
supporters. Although Hua Guofeng had been striped of all
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power during the 6th plenum of the 11th Party Congress in
June 1981, he was allowed to remained on the Standing
Committee until September 1982 as a face saving gesture.
After all, it was Hua who co-engineered the arrest of the
Gang of Four in 1976. Hua was officially ousted, and left
the political scene after the 12th Party Congress. Among
Hua's supporters, only Ye Jianying, Li Desheng and Ni Zhifu
have survived. Given Ye ' s age and poor physical condition,
his days of political life are limited. As for Li and Ni,
there are indications that they have switched sides to
support Deng since mid- 1983. Other members such as Ulanhu,
Nie Rongzhen and Xu Xiangquian have, in fact, become
politically inactive. Even though Li Xiannian, a 75 year
old supporter of Hua, was elected to the newly-restored
position of President of the People's Republic, and chaired
the 6th National People's Congress (NPC), his days are
numbered. The weeding-out process desired by Deng may take
a little while longer, but the composition of the 12th CCPCC
Standing Committee leaves plenty of room for the possibility
of more substitution while Deng is still active. In short,
the vast majority of the Standing Committee members appears
to be closely allied with Deng. All of them are holding
concurrent leadership positions in the Central Secretariat,
Military Commission, and the State Council. Those who are
openly at odds with Deng currently do not pose a long term
threat to Deng's succession plan.
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In addition to the Standing Committee, the restoration
of the Central Secretariat at the 5th Plenum of the 11th CCP
Party Congress, in February 1980, was one of the most
important institutional changes since Deng's return to the
political spotlight. The position of General Secretariat of
the Central Secretariat was held by Deng from 1956 to 1966.
It was abolished during the CR when Mao felt this
organization became too influential under Deng's
stewardship. Many of its functions were then turned over to
the CCPCC General Office and the Central Cultural Revolution
Group under the control of the Gang of Four. Under the new
Party Constitution (1982), restoring the Central Secretariat
was an important step toward reinstitutionalizing Party
power. Article 21 of the Party Constitution stipulates that
"the Secretariat attends to the day-to-day work of the .CC
under the direction of the Political Bureau and its Standing
Committee" . ^ ^ "* The Constitution describes the Central
Secretariat's authority in brief general terms, thus leaving
considerable room for its expansion of activities. Since
February
. 1980 , the Secretariat has expanded considerably to
facilitate Deng's power consolidation plan. At the 5th
plenum of the 11th Party Congress, 11 people were elected to
the Secretariat, with Hu Yaobang as the General
^^"•Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics , 1985, p
350-351.
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Secretary . ^ ^ ^ The 12th Party Congress elected ten
secretaries with the average age of the group at 64.^^^ The
replacements such as Deng Liqun, Chen Pixian, Hu Qili, Qiao
Shi, and Hao Jianxiu are significant in at least two
respects. They are relatively younger (average age 61) and
better educated, thus fulfilling Deng's policy objective in
recruiting younger and better qualified cadres and leaders.
They are also known to be proteges of Deng, Hu , and Zhao.
According to a biographic sketch published in Renmin Ribao
and Beij ing Review
,
both Hu Qili and Chen Pixian were
closely associated with Hu Yaobang in the Communist Youth
League while Hu was the First Party Secretary in the
1950s. ^^^ This group of day-to-day directors of the powerful
CCPCC Standing Committee is considerably younger and better
educated than the Politburo members as a whole. Jour of the
previous secretaries were elected and promoted to the
Politburo in September 1982. This move to replace four
secretaries was considered necessary partly because of
reassigning their major areas of responsibility while making
^^
^Others elected were: Wan Li, Wang Renzhang , Song
Renquong, Fang Yi , Gu Mu , Yu Qiuli, Yang Dezhi, Hu Qiaomu,
Yao Yilin, Peng Chong , and Xi Zhongxun.
^^^The ten secretaries were: Hu Yaobang, Wan Li, Xi
Zhongxun, Deng Liqun, Yang Yong , Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu , Chen
Pixian, Hu Qili, Yao Yilin, and two alternates, Qiao Shi,
and Hai Jianxiu.
^
^^ Renmin Ribao, 3 April 1982, p. 3, Beijing Review, 20
September 1982, pp. 22-24, and 20 September 1982, pp. 23-24.
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room and giving opportunity to develop other upcoming
confidents of Hu Yaobang.
Deng's power building was not confined to the center of
the political stage. Since 1980, Deng has made personnel
and organizational changes at every level. According to Hu
Yaobang, there are five categories of people who should be
excluded from leading posts in the Party and government
bureaucracy. The five categories are: those rising to
prominence by "rebellion"; those seriously factionalist in
their ideas; those indulging in beating, smashing, and
looting; those opposing the 11th CCPCC ' s 3rd Plenum line;
and those seriously violating the law and discipline . ^ ^ ^ The
implications are obvious. Most cadres who acquired postions
during the CR will be removed; radicals opposing Deng's new
Party line will be weeded out; those suspected of engaging
in disruptive and corrupt activities will be ousted to
ensure Party discipline. On the other hand, the Party cadre
policy emphasizes the recruitment and promotion of those who
have accepted Deng's policy line, who are younger, and who
possess specialized skills and higher educational levels.
Conversely, these criteria have become a convenient
yardstick for eliminating Deng's political opponents. In
short, the new cadre policy is to install a group of leading
^^^Hu Yaobang, "Create a New Situation in All Fields of
Socialist Modernization", Beij ing Review , 37 (13 Sept 1982),
p. 36.
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cadres that will assist Deng in strengthening and broadening
the power base of the future caretakers of his programs.
An examination of provincial leadership turnover since
1980 reveals a single fact- -Deng has made personnel changes
rivaled in scale but not in violence to those of CR. During
the period from 1980 to 1984, Deng has replaced 23 out of 29
provincial leading Party secretaries and 27 out of 29
provincial leaders . ^ ^ ^ As a result of the mass turnover,
only six (6) of the 29 provincial- level CCP
secretaries/ first secretaries who held office at the
beginning of 1979 are still in power, and not a single
chairman/ governor/mayor survived Deng's personnel shuffling.
(See Table VI below)
At the mass level, the problems associated with the
personnel reform are not limited simply to replacing cadres
one for one or strictly on the basis of one's loyalty. The
main problems associated with the cadres' inadequate
background in education, skill, and age are all too-deeply
rooted, and are unlikely to be solved within a short time.
Of the current 39 million Party members in 1982, only 15.8%
had been educated at or above senior high school level, and
those who had knowledge of modern technology are fewer
^^^There are 29 administrative units in China: three
separate municipalities, five autonomous regions, and 21
provinces. Each unit has a GCP Committee led by either a
first secretary or a secretary. The governments of these



















































































































































































still. ^^° In order to bring more educated and professional
personnel into the government and party organizations,
numerous measures have been taken to train cadres and to
raise educational standards in colleges. The Party reform,
a broad based retraining campaign, includes programs for
regular job training, rotating study on ideology and Party
line, and part time studies at night through correspondence
and radio broadcast courses. ^^^ In addition to the informal
programs, central and provincial party schools have been
restored which offer a variety of educational and
reorientation programs to improve the cadres' skills and
professional knowledge . ^ ^
^
Despite all the emphasis top Party leadership has given
to the importance of education and professional skills, this
new policy has not been accepted by many cadres. For
example, an investigation conducted by the CCPCC
Organization Department in April 1984 found that the ".
.policy toward intellectuals has not been conscientiously
implemented and that the malpractice of not respecting
knowledge and talented people has continued ." ^ ^ ^ Also, on 8
^'"Hu Yaobang, Beijing Review
,
37 (13 September 1982),
p. 36.
^ ^ ^
"Party and Government Cadres to Receive Training",
Beijing Review
,
43 (25 October 1982), pp. 5-6.
^^^David Bonavia, "Down but not yet out". Far Eastern
Economic Review
,
14 February 1983, p. 22.
^ ^
^Hsuan Mo, "Peking's Policy Toward Intellectuals: Who
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July 1984, the Renmin Ribao carried this article in
reference to Jiangsu province's attempt to implement the
education policy:
. . . the implementation of policies is probably the
most difficult thing to do. Nevertheless, the policy
toward intellectuals is the most difficult to implement.
Since the smash of the "Gang of Four" one of the major
tasks emphasis by Comrade Xiaoping is the implementation
of the policy toward intellectuals. It is also a task
reiterated all the time by the Party Central committee
in the past years. The departments concerned have
examined the implementation of this policy once every
year. Nevertheless, the result of this examinations has
always been surprising. Take Kiangsu province for
example: the problems discovered this year are
surprisingly serious. ^^'*
Deng Xiaoping apparently envisioned that implementation
of his programs, as well as restoring and broadening his or
his successors' power base, are primary step toward his
ultimate goal: a smooth succession. During the period from
1976-1984, he has mapped out a strategy of rebuilding a
stable power base that started at the very top and gradually
expanded outward and downward.
Deng's initial effort from 1976 to early 1978 was to
bring himself back into the PRC ' s political spotlight. 1978
to 1980, as discussed earlier, involved the struggle to gain
control of the CCPCC General Office, the Organization
is Hindering its Implementation?" Issues and Studies
,
August 1984, p. 10.
^^"Yeh Pan, "Why is it so Difficult?" Renmin Ribao,
July 1984.
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Department, the Propaganda Department, CCPCC, and the
Politburo. By the 5th Plenum of the 11th Party Congress
(February 1980), Deng had virtually dominated the Party
center. From the 5th Plenum of the 11th Party Congress to
September 1984, wholesale changes of the CCPCC membership,
provincial leaders, and provincial and municipalities Party
secretaries were completed. Superficially, Deng appears to
have managed the progress of personnel changes quite well at
the national and provincial levels. But the problems of
elderly cadres unwilling to retire, and the mass cadre
members' lack of education, skill, and competence, are all
too real and widespread. Nontheless, under Deng's
leadership and personnel policy direction of broadening the
power base, the significant personnel changes the PRC has
witnessed during the past six years will most likely
continue to ensure a smooth succession transition from Deng
to the next generation.
B. DENG'S POLICIES: A WELL FROG'S VIEW
The policies developed by Deng Xiaoping and advanced at
the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress were emphasized
again and again at the latest Party Congress Plenum (3rd
Plenum 12th PC, October 1984) and the NPC session (6th NPC
,
June 1983). Deng's policies can generally break down into
the following categories: ideological redefinition,
institutional reform, personnel change, economic
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development, and rectification of the Party style of work
and organization in line with the new Party Constitution.
From the rise of Hua to the 3rd Plenum of the 12th Party
Congress (October 1984), the ideological development in the
PRC can generally be divided into two stages: maintaining
the overall ideological continuity with the pre-Mao era and
redefining of Mao's ideology.
The first stage of ideological development coincided
roughly with the period of Hao Guofeng's relatively
uncontested ascendency up to the 3rd Plenum of the 11th
Party Congress. This stage was highlighted by the
publishing of Hua's "two whatevers" editorial in which
"Whatever Mao had said and whatever Mao had done should be
treated as a binding precedent ." ^ ^ ^ Hua not only sought to
maintain continuity with the broad outlines of Mao's
thought, but also reaffirmed (with the exception of
criticizing the Gang of Four for distorting the true reason
behind the CR) the value of the CR under the dictatorship of
the Proletariat . ^ ^ ^ Finally, at the 11th Party Congress, the
^^^The "Two Whatevers" derives from an editorial jointly
published by Renmin Ribao , and Red Flag on 7 February 1977.
It stated: "Whatever policies Chairman Mao devised, we will
resolutely support; and whatever directives Chairman Mao
laid down, we will forever observe." Hua Guofeng reiterated
the principle of the "Two Whatevers" later and said that
"the criticism of Deng and the counterattack against the
Rightest deviationest wind of reversing past verdicts were




^ Beijing Review , 42 (September 1976), pp. 3-4, 35
103
"triumphant conclusion" of the CR was announced. A
strenuous effort to reaffirm the importance of the "key-
link" of class struggle was advanced through the slogan
"grasp the key link of class struggle and establish great
order across the land."^^^ Hua's attempt to maintain a sense
of continuity with Mao's ideology was linked closely to
loyalty and legitimacy . ^ ^ ^ He had a vested interest in
reaffirming Mao's reputation for infallibility precisely
because his own position was justified by the criterion.
Just as Hua had an incentive to retain Mao's reputation
for infallibility, Deng had an opposite incentive to expose
Mao as quite fallible. Aside from obvious personal reasons,
on a much broader issue, Deng had to redefine Mao's ideology
before he could make any major changes in rebuilding the
country. He began redefining Mao's ideology by attacking
the Gang of Four. Indirectly, as the Gang of Four became
proven wrongdoers, Mao's image was also being tarnished and
discredited. By December 1977, it became apparent that
Mao's legacy had been suppressed from the press. In fact,
Mao's publications and quotations were used selectively to
either discredit Mao's irrational decisions in his later
years or to enhance the programs advanced by Deng to
(August 1977), pp. 6-13, and 3 (17 January 1977), pp. 29-32
^^^Ibid.
^^^See Chapter III for detailed justification.
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redevelop and modernize the country. Of particular interest
was the publication of Mao's 1962 speech to 7000 cadres, on
1 July 1978. In this speech, Mao "admitted he had made
serious mistakes and should be criticized for the ill-fated
GLF programs. . . he knew very little about 'economic
construction' or about industry and commerce. . . and be
held fully responsible for them."^^^ Two other publications
attracting equal attention and providing Deng with
additional legitimacy were "Uninterrupted Revolution" and
Mao's speech to a women's group in 1941.^'*° The main points
emphasized through these two publications were the
importance of economic construction through science and
technology, and the primacy of actual practice and
investigation in justifying a theoretical viewpoint.
The final assessment of Mao came during the 6th Plenum
in June 1981 when the CCPCC approved the "Resolution on
Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the
Founding of the PRO. " ^ " ^ This document represented a
culmination of intensive discussion and debate about Mao's
role in the Party. Based on official documents published,
Mao's major mistakes can be broken down as follows:




25 and 12 December 1978 respectively.
^"^ Beijing Review , 27 (6 July 1981), pp. 10-39.
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1. Comrade Mao Zedong and many leading
comrades . . . had become smug about their successes,
were impatient . . . the great leap forward and the
movement for rural people's communes were initiated
without careful investigation and study and without
prior experimentation^"^ 2. Comrade Mao Zedong widened
and absoluted the class struggle. . . .As a result,
quite a number of the cadres at the grass-root level
were unjustly dealt with in the latter half of 1964, and
early in 1965 the erroneous thesis was advanced that the
main target of the movement should be 'those Party
persons in power taking the capitalist road.''^*^ 3. The
"cultural revolution" which lasted from May 1966 to
October 1976, was responsible for the most severe
setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party,
the state and the people since the founding of the
People's Republic of China. It was initiated and led by
Comrade Mao Zedong.
The Party's evaluation of Mao's mistakes stretched for a
period of 19 years (1957-1976). Considering that Mao's rise
to the top began at the Zunyi Conference in 1935, about half
of Mao's service as the top. leader of the PRC was immersed
^
"*
^Mao was responsible for mistakes committed in the
1958 GLF and the commune programs. He was blamed for
"leftist" errors in promoting unrealistic targets and
issuing arbitrary decisions. The Party charged that Mao
violated his own practice by initiating new experiments
without thorough investigation, study, and prior
experimentation. While the Party assessment noted that Mao
had made self-criticism in 1962 for his mistakes in the 1958
disaster, this did not exonerate him from the error. See
Huang Kechen's article in Beij ing Review
,
"How to assess
Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought," 17 (17 April 1981), p.
22, and Wang Contemporary Politics , 1985, p. 65.
^
'*
^Mao was blamed for widening the erroneous policy of
class struggle and mistakenly applying the theory of
contradiction in the Socialist Education Campaign in 1963.
The 1963 Socialist Education Campaign insisted that the
contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie
was the main contradiction and focused on Party cadres and
plunged the country into confusion and chaos. See Beij ing
Review
,
27 (6 July 1981), p. 19-20, and Wang Contemporary
Politics
, 1985, p. 65.
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in erroneous leadership work style. But, despite all the
mistakes Mao committed (and twice against Deng personally),
Mao Zedong's thought is still being preserved today. ^''''
While the philosophies and thoughts of Mao Zedong have been
preserved, all of the published material emphasizes Mao's
theories on seeking truth from facts and eulogizes Mao as a
great Marxist and a great proletarian revolutionary,
strategist, and theorist. By continuing to uphold Mao's
thoughts in a selective manner, Deng has, in essence,
redefined Mao's thought in supporting his policies of
seeking truth from facts and has appeased a still formidable
opposition force. Conversely, to repudiate Mao completely
would have a negative effect on the history of the Party and
would negate the theoretical system that has long guided the
Party. And it would undermine the legitimacy of the PRC
Party-State.
In December 1984, Renmin Ribao published an article
entitled "Theory and Practice" ^ " ^ which argued that one
should never take a dogmatic attitude toward Marxism. It
concluded by stating, "We cannot expect the writings of Marx
and Lenin in their time to solve our present-day problems."
Even though the conclusion was changed the following day by
^'*'*A list of some of the major publication in recent
years can be found in "The CCP ' s Evaluation of Mao Tsetung
and His Thought", Issues and Studies , February 1985, p. 35.
^ '*
^ Renmin Ribao, 21 December 1984.
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adding "all" before "our present-day problems," this article
clearly indicated that the current leadership cannot avoid
making certain changes to Marxist theories under the
irresistible pressure of economic change. Needless to say,
economic reform has been the top priority of the PRC
leaders. While the search for a correct formula for
successful modernization and industrial development
continues, the current leadership under Deng has revised the
economic programs several times since 1978. Aside from
revising the economic programs, numerous personnel changes
in the economic planning and management organizations have
taken place to enhance the implementation of the reforms.
The most notable changes were the replacement of Zhang Jinfu
by Lu Dong in the State Economic Commission and the
replacement of Yao Yilin by Song Ping in the State Planning
Commission. ^ ** ^ In considering the economic reforms, one must
not forget that the economic and the political are closedly
linked. While the economic policies of the present
leadership may be directed toward economic reform, one
should remember that the results of economic reform have a
direct impact on the political future of the reformers . ^ "* ^
^'*^Both Song Ping and Lu Dong are believed to be Zhao
Ziyang's proteges. See Wang's discussion on the importance
of these two ministries as a vehicle to PRC economic reform.
^"•'As Mao had personally experienced in the late 1950 's
after the disastrous failures of the GLF
.
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The Sixth Five-Year Plan covers the period 1981-1985.
In September 1982, the major economic goal was established
by the 12th Party Congress to quadruple the total output
value of industry and agricultural by the year 2000. In the
last few years, a new system of "production responsibility"
has widely replaced the commune system, resulting in sharp
increases in productivity and in the average income of the
peasantry. In the realm of industry, first experiment with
granting greater autonomy to the factories were started by
Zhao Ziyang in Sichuan province in 1978. ^'*® As a result of
success in these experiments, greater enterprise autonomy
was extended to other areas of the country, and by the end
of that year, 2,600 plants had participated in such
experiments. At the end of 1980, 6,600 factories, out of
85,000 state-owned enterprises, were experimenting with this
program and had accumulated RMB29 billion in profits. ^"^
^'*^One of the major reforms was granting certain rights
to the enterprises: 1. The right to retain part of the
profits; 2. the right to expand production with funds that
the enterprise itself had accumulated; 3. the right to
retain 60% instead of 40% of the depreciation fund for fixed
assets; 4. the right to engage in production outside the
state plan; 5. the right of the enterprise to engage in the
marketing of its products; 6. the right to contract with
foreign governments and firms to export its products; 7. the
right to issue bonuses to workers at the enterprise's own
discretion; 8. and the right to fire workers who neglected
their work. See Beij ing Review , 6 April 1981, p. 23. for
more detail on these rights.
^'*^Willy Kraus , Economic Development and Social Change
in the People ' s Republic of China, (New York: Springer,
1982), p. 44-63.
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Moreover, elements of a market economy were increasingly
introduced into the commercial and service sectors of the
economy. ^^^ In this context, private enterprises such as
small restaurants, barbershops, photographers, and street
vendors were again allowed to operate in the cities after
late 1979. In late 1981, the number of people working in
such private small enterprises stood at 1.13 million, ^^^ and
by late 1983, the number had reached 7.36 million, or almost
7 percent of the urban work force. ^^^
While these reforms represent a major step toward
decentralization and market economy, implementation of these
new policies has been hindered by various obstacles and has
created many new problems. First, as a part of enlarging
enterprises' autonomy and a step toward breaking the "iron
rice bowl" mentality, a job-contract system was introduced
in 1983.^^^ Although the economists and reform supporters
^^°This concept was introduced under the principle of
"planned economy as the main factor, market economy as a
supplement" by Li Xiannian in January 1982. See China News
Analysis
,
1227 (26 February 1982).




(Beijing: Economic Management Publishing Corporation, 1982),
Part 8, p. 6.
^'^Domes, 1985, p. 205, and Jiefangjun Bao (JFJB)
,
(Liberation Army News), 7 march 1984.
^ ^
^Under the new labor contract system, workers
recruited in 1983 must be hired on a contractual basis that
stipulates the type of duties, rights, and benefits.
Workers can resign or can be fired if they fail to fulfill
their obligations. See 3 February 1983 -China Daily
(English), p. 1, for a detailed description of the contract
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applauded the breakthrough in the labor system, workers and
demobilized military personnel have shown considerable
opposition and resistance. Consequently, the system have
been modified to apply only to the labor force employed
since 1983.
A second major obstacle has been the irrational and
indisciplined investment patterns since decentralization.
Most investment made by enterprises has been concentrated on
the highly profitable consumer goods industry. Many of them
are wasteful duplications, seeking only quick profit.
Consequently, thousands of small consumer goods plants have
been built to compete for scarce raw material while
investment in other key economic sectors has been
inadequate. Some key economic sectors such as energy,
transportation, and scientific research are currently the




'*A most recent example of this bottleneck was reported
in China Daily
,
(English) on 7 December 1984, p. 3. It
states: "In Shanghai, Xinjiang and Jiangsu provinces, when
the power industry's fuel reserves have been fallen nearly
50% .... The ministry of Water Resource and Electric
Power blamed the power crisis to the failure of the coal
industry to meet its commitments to the power plants.
^ ^
^Overinvestment is a very serious problem in the PRC '
s
attempt to modernize and develop its economy. For detailed
study and analysis of PRC ' s overinvestment problems see
Chu-yuan Cheng, "Economic Reform in Mainland China: in
Comparison to Yugoslavia and Hungary," Issues and Studies
,
September 1983; Joyce Kallgren, "China in 1983: The Turmoil
of Modernization," Asian Survey , January 1984, pp. 60-80




Third, the most troublesome of the new policies is in
the area of agriculture. Since the reform began in 1978,
the peasants, generally speaking, have benefited
considerably in their cash income and standard of living. ^^^
The new policy, the responsibility system, ^^^ however,
brought about unexpected population increase, decline of
farmland per capita, and excessive deforestfication.
Under the responsibility system the land is assigned to
peasant households according to family size. More working
hands in the family are considered beneficial both in terms
of manpower supply and sideline operations. Thus, it
rekindles the tradition of large families. This can be seen
in comparing the PRC birth rate of PRC in 1980 of 1.07% to
1.45% in 1982. At this rate of growth, the total population
projected for the year 2000 would be 1.3 billion. ^^'
Yuan' s Strategy for China' s Development
,
(White Plains:
M.E. Sharpe , 1983); and an excellent recent publication by




1 5 S Xinhua, 9 December 1984.
^^^Under this system, the title deeds to land and the
official ownership of large livestock, plow animals, and
large tools remain with the production team. The team can
decide whether to continue with collective production or to'
contract the means of agricultural production to a group of
families or individual household. The subject of "Rural
Responsibility System" was discussed under the titles of
"Peasants' Initiative Unleashed by Contracts", "Is It A
Retreat to Captalism", "Gap Between Rich and Poor is
Bridged", and "Will Farm Mechanization be Slowed" in Beij ing
Review, issues 44-47 in October and November 1984, pp.
18-21, pp. 23-23, pp. 24-27, and pp. 20-22 respectively.
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The agriculture policy has two other serious side
effects. A boom in housing construction has paralleled the
rise in the peasants' standard of living. As the demand for
housing space increases, land becomes more scarce. As land
becomes more scarce, the competition between grain- growing
and cash-crop agriculture becomes more sharp. From 1979 to
1983, the area sown with cash crops increased by 4.53
million hectares while total area for grains was cut by 6.67
million hectares. ^^^ Further diminishment of farm land will
pose a serious threat to agricultural development. The
other side-effect is that the increasing demand for fuel in
the rural area has resulted in the widespread felling of
trees and defoliation throughout the countryside. As a
result, many areas in northeast and southeast China have
been denuded of vegetation, with disastrous effects on the
environment
.
Fourth, the most serious problem of the economic reform
is in personnel. Despite major personnel reshuffling and
some mixed success in the economy since 1980, the economic
reforms have aroused considerable resistance from every
level of the Party and governmental bureaucracies . At one
extreme of the spectrum, radical Maoists condemn the reform





^^^"Fewer Grain Growers in Rural Area", Beij ing Review
,
13 (28 March 1983), p. 5.
113
as betraying Mao's teaching, blaming inequality of income,
smuggling, profiteering, and other social evils on the
economic reforms. The privileged bureaucrats and some army
leaders view the reform as a direct threat to their
authority and privileges. They have consistently sought to
create troubles to stall or retard progress in the economic
reforms. As a recent Beijing commentator's article
indicates : ^ ^ °
In answer to the call of Comrade Deng
Xiaoping, . . . the entire Army is studying and
implementing . . .and energetically supporting the
country's economic reconstruction; This is very good
and .should be continued .... But, in our life and
economic activities, we must strictly follow the
principles of the "decision" and must not allow persons
infected with departmentalism and individualism to avail
themselves ....
One day earlier another commentator's article revealed the
same type of problem in the state bureaucracy : ^ ^
^
Peasants going to cities to run tertiary industries is
beneficial to both the town and countryside. What is
there against it? It is a pity that some comrades are
not yet convinced about this and are not enthusiastic in
this matter. They either doubt the peasant's ability or




""Guard Against New Unhealthy Trends," Renmin Ribao, 7
December 1984, p. 4.
^^^"It is Good for Peasants to go to Cities to Run
Tertiary Industry," Renmin Ribao , 6 December 1984, p. 2.
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Economic reforms have been the centerpiece of Deng's
reform programs for many of the reasons discussed in the
preceding subsection. The leadership in Beijing recognizes
that there is no simple, short-term solution to the complex
and difficult economic problems. The GLF , CR, and immediate
post-Mao economic plan have all demonstrated the harsh
reality that clever slogans or good intentions cannot
substitute for a gradual and consistent approach to economic
problems. Even so, the most careful and pragmatic planning
will not ensure success. Unless Deng and his supporters can
solve some of the more pressing problems in the area of
support from all levels of bureaucrats, resource and
investment allocation, theory and practice
incompatibilities, and over-population, economic progress
will continue to be retarded and modernization development
will continue to be at a slow pace. In light of power
politics in the succession process, a successful or even
perceived successful economic reform could, without a doubt,
enhance the legitimacy of Deng's succession selections and
his established succession procedures. However, if the
economic problems of unemployment, inflation,
over-population, price fluctuation, and a widening gap
between rich and poor continue and becomes rampant, the
opposition forces within the CCP could become powerful
enough to seize opportunities to erupt the current policies
and seriously challenge Deng or his successors.
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C. MILITARY REFORMS
Although it is believed that civilian and military
leaders agree on the importance of professionalization in
the military, the issue of relative priority of military
modernization within the Four Modernization programs is
potentially the most divisive and explosive. When a western
military person discusses military modernization, he talks
about technology changes in the equipment and tactical and
strategy changes associated with that dynamic process. But
current military modernization, as articulated by Deng,
means essentially for the military to change from what it
"used to be" to "xian dai hua."^^^ In other words,
everything associated with the military has to be changed.
From one extreme where soldiers are required to become
educated to the other extreme where the concept of guerrilla
warfare has to take a back seat to complex, modern,
three-dimensional combined arms operations. It appears that
Deng envisions a two-pronged approach to the complicated
issue of military modernization. On the less economically
dependent approach, the. policy is to make the PLA younger,
more educated, technically competent, and politically
dependable. More dependent on budget allocation is
acquisition of modern weaponary. In the area of personnel
^ ^
^ Xian dai hua is a slogan commonly used in China to
express modern standards. Literally, it means to achieve
today's standards.
116
change, the current leadership has devised the following
solutions: demobilize and force retirement, recruit quality
soldiers, and promote younger, educated leaders . ^ ^
^
Hereafter, these solutions will be referred to as personnel
solutions
.
Personnel solutions are a part of the overall Party
rectification effort. In a recent Secretariat of the CCPCC
meeting, Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary, pointed out : ^ ^ "*
The first-stage party rectification has been carried out
according to the fundamental tasks, principles, policy,
and method. . .On the whole, party rectification work
over the past year has developed healthily and achieved
remarkable results. First-stage party rectification
involves. . .various major units of the Army.
Looking back to the measures that have been taken in the
area of personnel solutions (other than at the central
leadership level), one must agree with Hu ' s overall
assessment. To reduce the large number of aging officers of
primarily peasant background (who joined the PLA during the
pre-1949 era), with limited education, outdated concepts,
and no desire to give up their post, in 1981 Deng
established a general age guideline for corps commander at
50' s, divisional commanders at 40 ' s , and regimental
commanders at 30's.^^^ Later, other publications gave more
1 S 3 Hongqi , 16 December 1982, pp. 4-10
isut'QpQ Secretariat Discusses Party Rectification,
Xinhua, Beijing, 26 November 1984.
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precise age limits: corps commander, 55; divisional
commanders, 45; regimental commanders, 35; battalion
commanders, 30; and company commanders, 25.^^^ Accordingly,
a comprehensive retirement plan was drafted in 1983 to
induce aging officers to retire. ^^^ In April 1983, FEER
carried an article by V. G. Kulicarni which stated that
10-15% of aging PLA officers and noncommissioned officers
had retired and been pensioned under the new retirement
plan. At the soldier level, mass demobilization was also
planned to rid the military of old, uneducated, incompetent,
and ideologically undesireable soldiers. It has been
estimated that the PLA's rapid demobilization reduced the
PLA by about one million men between 1980 and late 1983.^^^
This reduction- in- force policy constitutes only one half of
the current personnel solutions. On the other side of the
coin, a strong push has been made to promote younger
^^^Deng's Selected Works
,
p. 342. Deng's address to






66 (April 1983), p. 9. (A Hong Kong based
magazine). Wang, pp. 176-177,
^'"'According to Bullard, there are six categories of
personnel to be separated from the PLA: two categories of
retirement ( lixiu and tuixiu) , demobilization ( tuiwu )
,
lateral transfer ( zhuanye ) , becoming an advisor, and going
on convalescent leave. Each of the categories is different
in privileges and benefits based, upon past sacrifices and
hardship experience during one's career. See Monte R.





and more educated junior military leaders and enforce higher
recruitment standards.
Since 1980, there have not been any published statistics
on the total number of promotions of educated junior
military leaders. But numerous sources have cited a number
of model units for their success in promoting educated,
youthful leaders. In early 1983, for example, about 200
college graduates were recruited and appointed to commanding
positions at both the divisional and regimental levels of
the missile units. ^^^ Also, according to several articles
carried in Jiefangjun Bao (the PLA newspaper), "a certain
communications regiments selected 16 graduates of
universities and colleges to take charge"; "11 middle-aged
intellectuals of the PLA navy political school were selected
for leadership posts and more than 60 percent of the
middle-aged intellectuals have become leading cadres." And,
more recently, "central committee of the logistic department
of the Nanjing MR has boldly promoted 311 intellectuals with
both ability and political integrity to leading posts at
various levels. "^^°
Along the same line, the current recruitment policy
requires the rural enlistees to be middle school graduates
16 9 Ta Kung Pao, 20 April 1983
^ ^
° Jiefangjun Bao, 21 April 1983, p. 2, 23 September
1982, p. 2., and 11 December 1984, p. 3, respectively.
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and urban enlistees to be senior middle school graduates . '^ ' ^
To become an officer in the PLA, one must not only be a
senior middle school graduate or technical school graduate,
but also be a military academy graduate. ^'^
While there are no questions about the intentions and
announced results of the personnel solutions initiated by
the reformers, it is still too early to conclude that Deng
and his supporters have triumphed over their opponents.
Despite no apparent open opposition to Deng's personnel
solutions, the million demobilized "undesirables", the
widening economic opportunity, and the "gap" between the new
urban recruits who are less disciplined and the "old-timer"^
superiors who are mostly malleable peasants, are all
potentially volatile issues which can undermine the
announced success.
Solutions to equipment modernization can generally be
divided into the following two categories: quick fix and
systemic long-term development effort. Within each of the
solutions the planners are preoccupied with the potentially
^^
^Middle school in PRC equates to US junior high
school and senior middle school is the same as US high
school. The difference in entrance requirements is because
rural youths are only guaranteed eight years of schooling,
whereas urban youths are guaranteed ten years. See Bullard,
pp. 26-27, and Wang, p. 250.
^ '
^Yang Dezhi addressed these standards at the 12th
Conference of Military Academies and schools in February
1983. Xinhua, Beijing, 5 March 1983 in FBIS , China , 9 March
1983, p. K/8.
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divisive issue of specifying particular military priorities
among various areas of urgent need. According to
Congressional hearings in 1980, between "41-63 billion US
dollars"^ '^ was the estimated cost to modernize PLA.
"3000-8600 medium tanks, 8000-10000 armored personnel
carriers, 16000-24000 heavy duty trucks, 6000 air-to-air
missiles, 700 mobile surface-to-air missile launchers, 200
air superiority fighters, and 240 fighter bombers" ^^'' are
necessary to provide PRC with a confident capability to
defend herself against the Soviet Union. Faced with the
enormous costs and difficult choices of prioritization,
Deng, not surprisingly, has repeat ly appealed to the PLA
that it should "subordinate its work to the overall
interests of national construction. " ^ ^ ^ However, in an
attempt to provide a psychological "quick fix"^^^ and to
^''^See Eugene F. Tighes ' testimony in Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economic in Government of
the Joint Economic Committee
,
Allocation of Resources in the
Soviet Union and China, 1979, Part V, 96th Congress, 1st
Sess., 26 June 1979, pp. 120-126.
^^"Ibid., For more detailed US Department of Defense
assessment of PRC defense capabilities see Ronald G Mitchell
and Edward P. Parris testimony, pp. 66-72.
^^^Liu Huaqing, "Build a Powerful Navy, Develop China's
maritime Undertakings," Xinhua, Beijing, 23 November 1984 in
FBIS, China, 27 November 1984, p. K/5.
^'^Defence-related equipment obtained from the west has
negligible impact or has made relatively unimpressive
improvement in the PRC ' s military capability during the
early 1980s. However, the availability and accessibility of
western military hardware to the Chinese give them a
psychological boast. Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow,
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appease the disgruntled military leaders, Deng has
encouraged "buying from the west shopping trips" by high
level PRC military delegations from 1980 to 1984.^^^ In
1980, there were thirteen major negotiations involving the
PRC and various western nations on equipment ranging from
jet and frigates to Chinese DC-9 landing gear door
production.^'* Furthermore, in 1983, twenty major agreements
or negotiations were conducted with various western nations
on electronic systems , ^ ' ^ More recently, there have been
"agreement- in-principle" with the US to acquire the I-HAWK
surface-to-air missile system and the TOW wire-guided
anti-tank missile system. Other major purchases of western
military hardware included the following agreements: AMC
jeep for Chinese production of 10,000 trucks, with follow-on
production likely; purchase of Creusot-Loire 100mm gun
"Chinese Military Modernization: The Western Arms
Connection", China Quarterly
,
June 1982, pp. 264-265. (pp.
253-279)
^'"'The Chinese shopping trips have been highly
publicized. However, they have actually made very few
purchases of foreign systems. In fact, Chinese arms imports
in terms of US dollars actually declined considerably in
1982. They spent an average of $114 million from 1973 to
1979 while in 1982 only $40 million was spent on the




US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, April
1984, p. 64.
^'^Stuart and Tow, "China's Military Turns to the West",
International Affairs, Spring 1981, pp. 292-293.
^ '
^Wendy Friedman, Foreign Technology and China '
s
Weapons Acquisition Process : Technical Note
,
(Menlo Park:
SRI International, December 1984), pp. 81-83, (draft).
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mount; and agreement in mid- June between the China State
Shipbuilding Corporation and Ishifawaj ima-Harima Heavy
Industries to co-operate in the modernization of China's
marine diesel engine production. Moreover, the Chinese have
bought Sikorsky helicopters from United Technologies.^^" The
effectiveness of Deng's psychological quick fix solution is
questionable. An analysis of recent literature on PRC
foreign and national security objectives, however, suggests
that in near the term (five to ten years), China does not
perceive an imminent danger of military conflict from either
the US or USSR.^'^ Also, a cursory examination of the final
purchases and production/co-production contract, reveals the
PRC is focusing on specific weaknesses such as mobility,
coastal defense, and anti-tank capabilities . ^ ^ ^ These
findings are not intended to suggest that the PRC ' s interest
^ '" Xinhua
,




^^^See William Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Rapproachment ?" in
Problems of Communism, March-April 1983, pp. 20-29
Thomas Robinson, "China's Dynamism in the Strategic
Triangle", Current History
,
September 1983, pp. 241-277
and Donald Zagoria, "The Moscow-Beijing Detente",
International Affairs, Spring 1983, pp. 853-873.
^'^On the mobility problems the Chinese encountered
during the Sino-Vietnamese conflict see Jencks ' "China's
Punitive War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment", Asian
Survey
,
August 1979, pp. 801-815. For deficiencies in
anti-tank and coastal defense see James Gregor, "Western
Security and the Military Potential of the PRC", Parameters
,
1 1984, pp. 35-48. For a complete list of PRC defense needs
see David Shambaugh "Chin's Defense Industries" in Pual
Godwin, ed
.





Westview Press, 1983, p. 71.
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in acquiring advanced foreign military hardware and
technology is not real. Instead, it proves that Chinese
reformers are fully aware that any major transformation in
qualitative characteristics of the PRC defense posture will
occur only after an incremental progression in the entire
range of scientific and technological infrastructures.
Therefore, it is appropriate, at this time, to turn our
attention to the Deng's long-term military modernization
solutions and problems.
As stated in the last subsection, under Deng's grand
design to modernize the PRC, the FLA should "subordinate"
its modernization effort to the overall interests of the
nation. From a budgetary point of view, the PLA budget has
steadily been cut back during the past half dozen years,
which accurately reflects the low priority Deng has given to
military modernization programs.
Nontheless, the two-tracked program to both import advanced
technology to overcome specific problems in the quick fix
solution, and the incremental development of a modern
indigenous military research, development and production
capability, is apparently working. In the area of aerospace
technology, after long negotiations, agreements have been
reached between Chinese organizations and McDonnell Douglas
to coproduce the DC-9 MD-80.^^^ The Shanghai Aircraft
^'
'"China to Assemble 25 McDonnell Douglas MD-80s",
Aerospace Daily
,









1979 22 3 14.59
1980 19 4
1981 16 9 9.853
1982 17 9 9.464
1983 17 713 8.959
1984 17 87 8.189
SourcerThe International Institute for Strategic






Note: Military expenditures indicated in this Table:
in billion yuan/ US dollar. 1979 actual military
expenditure was higher than the amount had been
budgeted as result of Sino-Vietnamese conflict.
Industrial Corporation will assemble the airliners using
both US and Chinese components and subassemblies.
Incremental improvements to current systems as a result of
improving civilian electronics technology are seen in the
main battle tank (MBT). The type-69 MBT which, is an
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upgrade of the type-59 incorporates an infrared search light
and a laser range finder. The steady advance of electronics
absorption and integration in the civilian sector can
eventually be translated into performance improvements for
many outdated weapon systems in the PLA. Another
encouraging sign is the organizational change and
redefinition of the area of responsibility in Chinese
weapons procurement organizations. This very change is an
indication of the reformers' determination to make military
modernization a long-term process. Of all the changes that
have taken place in recent years, adding a state CMC, the
reorganization of the Commission on Science, Technology and
Industry for National Defense (NDSTIC), and the Ministries
of Machine Building are the most important . ^ ^ "*
Having reviewed and presented Deng's solutions to PRC
military modernization and reform, one must ask the
question: What impact does this have on the political
succession process? More importantly, What are some of the
^^"The NDSTIC performs the following functions: planning
of defense related research and development; allocation of
resources for R&D and supervision and construction of R&D
facilities; design, building, and testing of military
hardware phototypes; supervision of PLA training and in
science and technology; interfacing between the PLA and the
industrial ministries; and coordination and planning of R&D
in the eight defense-related ministries of machine building.
For a detailed discussion, see David Shambaugh, "China's




Company, 1983), pp. 46-62. Also see Wang, Contemporary
Politics
, 1985, pp. 159-160, and Xinhua, Beijing, in FBIS
,
27 July 1983, pp. K/17-18 for the function of the State CMC,
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problems this change will bring upon Deng's design for a
smooth political succession? To answer these two question,
it is necessary to examine several critical factors, which
can only be assessed in a partly speculative manner.
The first factor is personnel. Unfortunately, because
of the lack of data, it is difficult to identify with
certainty the strength of opposition among the demobilized
and forcibly retired officers and noncommissioned officers.
What is known generally is that there was at least one
incident of outright rebellion by a group of demobilized
soldiers in 1982 in Guangdong. Hu Yaobang confirmed, at
least in substance, the problems associated with demobilized
soldiers in an interview with Hong Kong based Ming Pao
editor, Cha Lianyong in December 1984:
Cha : But, people overseas fear that there will be
unrest in the Army. Interference from the Army might
possibly be a stumbling block to the implementation of
the current policy.
Hu Yaobang: There were incidents, such as shootings by
company or platoon leaders, in the PLA units 3 years
ago. But no such incidents have been recorded in the
past two years . ^ ^
^
Furthermore, at least one Army Headquarters composed of
mostly aging military leaders was reported in the JFJB: " At
the Army Headquarters, we can see that most of the leading




Hong Kong, 6 December 1984, in FBIS , 10
December 1984, p. W/4.
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back to the War of Resistance against Japanese
aggression. " ^ ® ^ Even on the reforms that seem to have
substantial military support, progress is still lacking. A
case in point is the reinstitution of military ranks which
was announced in 1982 and officially included in the May
1984 Military Service Law.^^^ During the 1 October 1984
National Parade at Tienanmen Square, there was no sign of
rank on the uniforms of the soldiers
.
On the positive side, numerous reports published by PRC
official publications seem to lend credence to the policy of
putting more educated soldiers in charge. In fact,
recently, the author had an opportunity to visit the PRC
Embassy in Washington, D. C. and interview the assistant
military attache, a graduate of Jinan University in 1973.
Although he does not have a rank, his duty position is
equivalent to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the US
military
.
In the area of equipment modernization, although PLA
leaders are accepting the cuts like good soldiers, the
competition for scarce resources will certainly hinder
military capability improvements, and can hardly improve
1 3 e JFJB, 5 August 1982, pp. 1-2
^ '' Xinhua
,
4 June 1984, in FBIS-China , 84-110, p. K/1.
The Military Service Law was adopted on 31 May 1984 by the
Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress.
Article 8: "The system of military ranks is to be
implemented in the Chinese People's Liberation Army."
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military support of Deng in time of crisis. A recent
article published by Xinhua certainly gave a strong
indication of discontent within the military to Deng's
reneging on one of his promises to modernize defense:
"Despite the Navy's achievements, its building is lagging
behind both in scale and degree of modernization. . . .we
must speed up naval modernization. " ^ ^ ^ On the other hand,
the reformers expect that the current organizational changes
and investment in the infrastructure, basic industries,
training, and foreign technology absorption will build a
solid fundation for the future.
Deng has made many radical changes in the past half
decade in the area of military reforms and modernization.
Clearly, with great efforts, Deng has been able to push the
military in the general direction he wants. Equally
clearly, he could not bring about a clear break with the
past, and resistance is heavy, as indicated by the previous
discussion. It seems that Deng hopes to nurture a
generation of new military officers who hold similar loyalty
and commitment to a stronger China through his policies.
Success, on the one hand, depends heavily on Deng and his
associates' efforts to contain military participation in the
political decision process. On the other hand,
' '
'Liu Huaqing, P. K/7.
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a measureable success in economic growth, translated into
equitable economic benefits to the military, is essential in
maintaining that fragile balance.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although other elements such as limited historical
precedence and the lack of institutionalized legal political
succession were discussed briefly in the Introduction, the
briefness of their treatment was not indicative of their
lack of importance; rather, it was the author's intention to
limit the scope of this thesis to the problems of the
military as a participant, of the power base, and of Deng's
policy alternatives. Moreover, after having narrowed the
scope of the succession problems, the problems of military,
power base, and Deng's policy alternative still cannot be
covered fully in the short span of this research paper.
However, this paper is intended to provide enough
informational and analytical foundations about Chinese
political succession procedures that it may be a building
block for other students of contemporary Chinese politics.
In this concluding chapter, by way of summing up the
salient points of this thesis, an attempt will be made to
speculate the near term (5-10 years) outcome of PRC
succession politics. Realizing the danger and purely
speculative nature in predicting the outcome of the complex
problems associated with political succession, I will focus
this chapter on answering the question: Will China, after
Deng, be able to minimize political conflict and ideological
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oscillation while continuing to pursue its present
modernization policies?
Before venturing into this question, one must make an
assumption that Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang will stay-
healthy, at least through 1995. While this assumption may
not sound too outrageous (Hu is 69; Zhao is 65), the
experience of Zhou Enlai who passed away, unexpectedly,
prior to Mao, taught everyone a hard lesson of "fate" over
science"
With this in mind, let us examine Hu ' s latest announced
plan of succession:
It is Comrade Ziyang and I who assume responsibility in
the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee. we
consult Comrade Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Xiannian on
major issues and, as for other general affairs, we two
make decisions on our own ... I am now 70 years
old ... He (Zhao Ziyang) is 66 years old . . . Both of
us cannot be expected to be working too far in the
future. I myself have an idea- I will withdraw and get
away gradually after the 13th CPC National Congress to
be held in 1987. '^^
Hu has described an institutionalized political succession
procedure in which the succession problems are solved by
redefining responsibilities into two tiers. Generally
speaking, the last generation of leaders is given the honor
to semi-retire while dealing strictly with the "major
i8 9M-^^ Yaobang Talks with Ming Pao Publisher", Ming Pao,
Hong Hong, 5 December 1984, p. 4, FBIS , 10 December 1984, p.
w4 . According to Hu , he is 70 years old by the traditional
Chinese way of counting one's age.
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issues." In contrast, the current generation of leaders has
the responsibilities of not only taking care of day-to-day
important issues, but also of cultivating a new generation
of leaders who will guarantee the continuity of the existing
policy. Although Hu did not mention specifically the
responsibilities of the emerging younger leaders, no doubt
the future of these younger leaders is directly related to
their allegiance and loyalty to the existing policy and the
current leadership. Obviously with Deng's approval, Hu
Yaobang is describing an institutionalized procedure by
which the current leaders hope that they will both establish
historical precedents and legalize the succession
procedures. As Deng held the difficult coalition of elderly
elites together during the past half decade, his proteges,
Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, are feverishly building a new
coalition of leaders while closedly scrutinizing and
cleansing leaders at all levels. When Deng and his
coalition pass on, in the not too distant future, his
proteges will move into the "major issues" decision role
while their successors will step into the "day-to-day"
important decision making role. In the long run, under the
institutionalized succession procedures, the content of
intra-elite conflict will become less and less determined by
the quest for political, economic, and social changes and
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more and more determined by bureaucratic politics . ^ ^
"
However, in the short run, the importance of the military,'
the power base, and policy alternatives still cannot be
oversimplified and ignored.
The power base, as illustrated by the fate of Hua
Guofeng in Chapter III, underlines the importance of broad
and deep backgrounds in PRC political maneuvering.
Realizing his proteges' precarious positions, Deng's
rectification plan since 1980 has been designed to
strengthen the formal power base through building a strong
institutional framework and bureaucratic procedures and
minimizing the necessity to resort to the informal power
base (where Hu and Zhao are weakest). On balance, Deng has
succeeded in building a stronger formal power base for his
successors since his return to power. He has, since 1980,
replaced Hua Guofeng with Hu Yaobang as the Party General
Secretary; replaced Hua Guofeng with Zhao Ziyang as the
State Premier; replaced Hua Guofeng with himself as the
Chairman of the Party Military Commission; replaced every
military district and garrison commander; replaced all but
two provincial leaders and 83% of the provincial party
secretaries; replaced all but two military regional
commanders and political commissars; replaced all of the
^^"Bureaucratic politics is used here in the sense
defined by Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision :
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
,
(Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1971), pp. 162-182.
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state governmental ministers; replaced all but three
positions in the important Central Party Organizations such
as the CCPCC Secretariat Office, General Office and
Propaganda Office. Most importantly, he has replaced 12 out
of 24 members of the most powerful organization in the PRC
,
the Politburo. An analogous magnitude of personnel changes
would be seen in the US if, as President, Ronald Reagan
replaced 90% of the Congressional members; replaced all of
the Supreme Court Justices; replaced all of the major
military command commanders and the chiefs of staff of all
services; and replaced most of the Secretaries in the
Government's Bureaucratic Departments and all cabinet
appointees
.
Although Deng's massive change in both central and
provincial leadership did not bring about an equivalent
change in Hu ' s and Zhao's power positions, it replaced
almost all of the leaders hardened by their experience in
the CCP revolutionary era with a group of post- 1949
"educated" bureaucratic administrators. Needless to say,
because of the shortage of experienced, highly trained, and
politically reliable junior administrators, one cannot
expect all of those selected for central and provincial
leadership positions to possess "star quality". In fact,
one of the frustrating issues facing Deng and his supporters
has been that the newly appointed officials, based on above
mentioned criteria, have not all handled their
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administrative responsibilities well. Furthermore, the few
"elderly cadres" remaining in the Politburo still command a
considerable informal power base of influence in the
political and military arena. If Deng passes away in the
near future and before Chen Yun, Ye Jianying, or Li
Xiannian,^^^ there is a higher risk of these elderly cadres
resurfacing and becoming potentially dangerous to Deng's
design for a smooth succession.
While formal power base building and institutionalized
succession procedure are progressing with minimal
opposition, Deng has experienced many obstacles in the areas
of military reform, modernization, and reduction of military
influence in the political process. However, the continuing
personnel turnover in the PLA and accelerated modernization
benefits derived from success in the economic sector, will,
undoubtedly, help to persuade the PLA to become more
institutionalized and professsionalized and less a
participant in the political process. In the meantime, the
question of the PLA's role at the time of Deng's demise will
be the ultimate concern of Deng, Hu , and Zhao. While there
is no secret about the close association Deng has had with
the PLA over the last half century, the relationships
^^^An excellent article in China News Analysis discussed
Li's power potential in factional struggles. China News
Analysis
,
1227 (26 February 1982), pp. 1-7. Although Chen
Yun has sided with Deng in the past against Ye Jianying,
Chen and Deng are at odds about certain economic policies
.
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between Hu and Zhao and the PLA are far more difficult to
establish. Furthermore, the identities of the military
successors at the top of the military establishment are
equally difficult to determine. As indicated in Chapter II
and Section A, Chapter IV, because the first generation of
aging military leaders is loosely held together by Deng at
the pinnacle of power, assessing their allegiance and
loyalty to Hu and Zhao is not possible. One of Hu ' s and
Zhao's foremost concerns with the military is the extend to
which the "Gang of Four's" lack of military support
contributed to their fall. Surely, Hu and Zhao can vividly
recall the events in 1976, when the arrest of the "Gang of
Four" was the direct result of many of Mao's military
supporters, led by Ye Jianying, who not only did not support
the radical Maoist, but also took the opportunity to get rid
of them. At present, there are some indications of military
opposition to the low priority given to national defence
modernization. More importantly, there are unmistakenly
clear indications of top military elites' opposition to the
issues of forced retirement and reinstitut ion of ranks. An
examination of the top twenty-six positions in the PRC '
s
military structure^ ^^ reveals that only five of the
^^^The twenty-six top positions are: nine in the CCPCC
Military Commission, eleven military regional commanders,
three service commanders, PLA Chief of Staff, Directors of
Logistical and Political Departments, and Minister of
National Defense. See Appendix B Handbook of Chinese
People ' s Liberation Army , Defense Intelligence Agency,
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twenty-six leaders are in their mid- to late- 60s, and the
average age of this group is about 74 years old.
Furthermore, the roster at the power center, the CCP Central
Committee, indicates that 58 out of 210 (28.1%) members
elected to the 12th CCPCC are military cadres serving in
combat units or former military cadres serving in the
national defense industrial system; of the 129 alternate
members of the CCPCC, 26 are serving of f icers . ^ ^
^
While there are many obstacles to overcome in dealing
with the military elites, there are two factors in favor of
Deng's design. The continuing replacement of commanders and
leaders below the military region level can only help to
streamline and professionalize the military at its base.
Thus, with a rapid increase in promoting younger,
technically skilled, administratively competent, and
professionally oriented bureaucrat-military leaders, the
influence and credibility of the senior military leaders
become further removed and hence weakened. The other factor
favoring Deng's design is the opening up of the PLA to
western technology and modern warfare. Among the many and
varied reasons for introducing both western technology and
modern warfare to the Chinese military, breaking "Mao's
ideological shackle" seems to stand out. Despite the
November 1984, and CHINAaktuell
,
February 1985, pp. 127-128.
'"MeB Mills, p. 28.
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rhetoric of "People's War", the PLA is unquestionably moving
in the direction of fighting combined arms warfare with
high-technology weapons. After being exposed to the
lethality of modern high- technology weapon systems, and
witnessing the combat-power of the combined arms concept,
the post-civil war generation finds the preaching of Mao's
guerrilla warfare by the Long March generation military
leaders less persuasive and, hence, less creditable. As a
result, the ability of the Long March generation military
leaders to influence the post-Civil War generation military
leaders steadily diminishes.
Any hope to achieve success in Deng's design for a
smooth succession. The element of economic reform is not
only the most critical but also potentially the most
explosive ingredient in Deng's design for a smooth
succession. Success in economic reforms brings measureable
changes such as higher incomes , improved standards of
living, and incorporates advanced technology into
defense-related production. Therefore, economic success
breeds legitimacy and strengthens the institutionalized
power base of Hu and Zhao. However, the problems of a
rising rural population; overinvestment, inefficiency, and
misappropriation associated with decentralized resource
allocation; animosity developed as a result of the widening
income gap and standard of living between urban and rural
workers are some of the potentially explosive issues which
139
could easily be exploited by a coalition of forces and
factions opposed to Deng's design. If the modernization
should prove to be or even be perceived to be a failure, the
wisdom of Deng's design and the legitimacy of Hu and Zhao
would certainly be called into serious question. Moreover,
the problems do not necessarily cease if economic reforms
succeed. A successful economic modernization mean greater
free market mechanisms injected into the Chinese economic
system, which, fundamentally, would make Marx-Lenin-Mao
ideology less compatible and justifiable with reality.
In sum, the problems of succession are clearly the
foremost concern facing the Chinese planners today. Deng's
design to promote younger, more educated, technically
skilled, administratively competent, and ideologically
reliable people along with two tiers of responsibilities
has, in most cases, solidified the formal power base of the
next generation of successors and thus removed the
susceptibility of future intra-elite conflict to rely on an
informal power base. In dealing with the problems of the
military as a participant in the political process, Deng
has, at least temporarily, restrained and curbed the
military as an active force in Chinese politics. To
maintain a proper balance in the solution of succession
problems, the modernization programs must generate real and
perceived success in the near term. Therefore, the outcome
of Deng's design for a smooth succession relies heavily on
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the successes in the modernization programs to provide the
legitimacy and confidence to the successors.
141
VI. EPILOGUE : IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US
Since the focus of this thesis has been on the problems
of succession in China, not on US problems in dealing with
China, it is appropriate to briefly and superficially
analyze and discuss the issues that are likely to face US
policy makers. Furthermore, a policy alternative will be
suggested at the closing of this discussion.
Before turning our attention to the current issues, we
need a brief review of the evolution of Sino-US relations.
Additionally, to deal with the Chinese effectively, it is
essential to elevate the American public and government to a
higher level of understanding of the basic and changing
character of Chinese people and society. A starting point
should be our recognition that the Chinese people and
society are basically inward looking. Since the turning of
the century Chinese has been struggling to develop and
modernize. Unfortunately, in the early past experience of
the 19th century, the Chinese attitude toward association
with Americans was different from the Americans attitude.
In dealing with China, America sought to give as well as
get; but the Chinese, a proud people, although weak, neither
enjoyed nor wanted help, especially America's
"save- the-heathen" type of help. Americans found their
experience with China adventurous, exhilarating, and
rewarding. More importantly, Americans who did not want to
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associate with the Chinese could avoid it. In contrast, the
Chinese not only found contact with Americans forced upon
them, but also suffered indignities and humiliation.
More recently, Americans have tended to shape their
images of China to fit preconceptions and moods of the
moment. We have witnessed the oscillating images of China
as a "big-bad" aggressive "bully" about to overrun Asia, to
a crippled "paper dragon" on the verge of internal collapse,
and finally to our "ace-in- the-hole" , the "China Card". On
the other hand, the Chinese view of the US has also swung
wildly from one extreme to the other. Undoubtedly, a mutual
deep understanding and appreciation of each other's national
characters is essential for the two nations to avoid
overred-ctions such as unjustifiable hostility or unrealistic
optimism. In dealing with the Chinese, US policy makers
must base their policies on a more realistic and
sophisticated view of the enormous complexity of variables
shaping the image. Keeping this in mind, for the
foreseeable future (5-10 years), what are our interests in
China? And What should our policy be toward China?
In this thesis, the background and nature of PRC
succession problems have been discussed and analyzeed at
some length; and a possible near term outcome of the
succession process has been suggested. Because so many
unknown and unpredictable variables influence the Chinese
succession process, the suggestion in the Conclusion
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Chapter, is not intended to be a final answer to the
succession question. Mistakes or miscalculations by Deng or
his successors could spark a domino reaction based upon
individual and group preferences, unfulfilled expectations,
ideological dilemmas, and inadequate institutional
infrastructures, such reactions could severely damage and
curtail the power of the successors and, in turn, damage the
interest of the US. However, any attempt by the US to
pursue manipulative policies designed to influence the
interaction of domestic factions would most likely be
counterproductive. On the other hand, if the US exercises
constraint, provides external environmental stability,
maintains a friendly no-alliance posture, and demonstrates a
willingness and encouragement to help China with her
fundamental problems, then, the interests of the US will be
more effectively served.
Cases in point can be seen in the achievements in the
realms of economic cooperation and cultural and educational
exchange. Since 1980, China has absorbed 12 billion^ ^'' US
dollars in foreign investments. In October 1984, China, in
addition to the original four special economic zones
established in 1980, designated ten more special economic
zone to attract foreign investments. Recently Deng Advised
the leaders of Shanghai to "learn from Shenzhen' " ^ ^ ^ and
China Business Review
,
January-February 1984, p. 29
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restore Shanghai to its "pre-1949 status as a national
centre of trade and finance"^ ^^ like that of New York,
Tokyo, and London. Moreover, it also has been reported that
42 Chinese corporations have been established and have
signed contracts with 40 countries for engineering projects
and labor services abroad. In the area of cultural and
educational exchanges, tens of thousands of Chinese students
and scholars have come to the US to study since 1979,
Kenneth Prewitt and Michel Oksenberg summarized better than
anyone else:
. . . it should be recognized that the US is opening its
science and technology to Chinese mainly for
reasons . . . (including) . . . strategic national
interests, the opportunity to train the next generation
of technologists in China, and the recognition that many
problems transcend national boundaries and require an
international community of scientists for their
solution. ^ ^
'
Our desire, therefore, to train the next generation of
Chinese intellectuals and scientists is, bluntly stated, to
"indoctrinate" the next generation of Chinese
nation-builders to be able to relate to the American culture
^ ^
^ Shenzhen is the special economic zone between Hong
Kong and southern Guangdong which has achieved considerable
success in absorbing foreign investments, technology, and








^Kenneth Prewitt (ed.). Research Opportunities in
China for American Humanists and Social Scientists
,
(New
York: Social Research Council, 1982), p. 46.
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and character and become less hostile toward the US. Simply-
put, a strong and modernized China that is non-hostile
toward the US should be the goal of US policy makers. On
the contrary, a weak, underdeveloped, isolated, and hostile
China will more likely to be a destabilizing influence in
East Asia.
Along the same line, the strategic consideration of
"playing the China Card" prompted by Nixon and Kissinger and
begun in July 1971 is potentially dangerous and should be
avoided. There is no question about Beijing's role as a
counterweight in offseting Soviet influence in Asia and in
complicating Soviet global military planning. However, the
Soviets have become more aggressive in their overt military
posture since the Shanghai Communique, as demonstrated by
the invasion of Afghanistan, the establishment of a naval
base at Cam Ranh bay, the enlargement of the Pacific Fleet
to be the largest of the four Soviet Fleets, the stationing
of SS-20 and Backfire bombers east of Urals, and the
build-up, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in
personnel and equipment in the southernmost Kuriles.^^^ On
balance, contrary to the strategic benefit the US supposedly
derives from a closer "strategic partnership" with China,
the Soviets have actually gained relative strength by
^'
^Anthony H. Coordesman, "The Military Balance in
Northeast Asia", Armed Forces Journal International
,
November 1983, pp. 80-98.
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feverishly building up every aspect of their Asian military
posture. Therefore, by all indications, US interests can
neither be served by a closer strategic relationship with
China, nor benefited by manipulating the hostility and
tension between the Soviet Union and China. Although the
leverage of US policy makers to influence the Sino-Soviet
relationship is limited, any subtle encouragement to the
current attempts at Sino-Soviet reapproachement would help
in reducing the possibility of an overt military
confrontation between the Soviets and Chinese. If American
policy makers want to pursue the goal of stability and peace
in the East Asia region, a policy of non-manipulation and of
continuing to seek improved relationship with both Beijing
and Moscow is critical in reinforcing that goal.
In conclusion, under the present circumstances of
uncertain Chinese internal politics and growing Soviet
strength in East Asia, US policy makers should not "play the
China Card" against the Soviet. Rather, emphasis should be
placed on providing China with external stability through
improving relation with Moscow while assisting the new
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